Janosko v. City Of Oakland

Background

Plaintiffs John Janosko and Jackson Blain sought a temporary restraining order, or TRO, to stop the City of Oakland from seizing and destroying property during the planned cleanup and closure of the 1707 Encampment. The plaintiffs had previously sought emergency relief concerning the encampment. The court had issued a limited TRO, later continued it, and then dissolved it after the City reported that shelter spaces were ready and residents had begun moving out.

The City later posted notices stating that the closure would begin on April 10, 2023. The plaintiffs filed this second TRO motion, arguing that the impending closure and property seizures would violate their Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures. The opinion states that the plaintiffs’ motion asserted Fourth Amendment claims, not Fourteenth Amendment due-process claims.

Legal standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, the standard for a TRO is the same as for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs had to show a likelihood of success on the merits, likely irreparable harm without relief, that the balance of hardships favored them, and that an injunction would serve the public interest. The court described a TRO as an extraordinary remedy requiring a clear showing that the plaintiffs were entitled to it.

Fourth Amendment analysis

The court distinguished this case from Ninth Circuit decisions involving the immediate destruction of unhoused people’s property. In those cases, officials destroyed property summarily, including property that was momentarily unattended or property that individuals were prevented from moving.

Here, the court found that the City had provided substantial advance notice, helped residents move and store some belongings, and allowed time to move items that the City would not store. The City offered storage for Janosko’s trailer, although his counsel said he refused that option because it would force him to choose between keeping the trailer and living with his community. The City did not agree to store tiny homes and other makeshift structures because it considered their materials unsafe or decaying. It also refused to move and store a 20-to-40-foot shipping container because it could not search and sort its contents for hazardous or unsafe materials.

The court found those refusals reasonable in light of the City’s stated interests in protecting workers, storage-site personnel, and local neighbors. It also found that the City’s policy was narrow because, according to the City, only belongings that were hazardous or dangerous to move or store could be destroyed. The court concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their Fourth Amendment claims. It considered notice as part of the reasonableness analysis but stated that its decision did not rest solely on notice.

Remaining factors

The court found that the plaintiffs made a strong showing of irreparable harm because destruction of their property could affect their shelter options. The court nevertheless found that the balance of hardships and the public interest favored the City. The stated purpose of clearing the encampment was to develop the site into affordable housing, which the court said would benefit the public and ultimately provide housing for 500 extremely low-, low-, and moderate-income individuals, including formally unhoused individuals.

The court also noted that the City had provided shelter beds, including tiny cabins and a new recreational-vehicle site, and had given residents notice and an opportunity to move their belongings. It concluded that the factors required for a TRO were not met.

Disposition

Judge Hiam H. Orrick denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order. The opinion does not state that the underlying Fourth Amendment claims were finally resolved.