Bala Rama Sundara Krishna Kireeti Mantripragada v. Flores

Background

Bala Rama Sundara Krishna Kireeti Mantripragada and Himani Mangasomayajula filed a petition seeking review of their removal to India and asking for declaratory and injunctive relief. They alleged that they had been living in the United States in F-1 student status and later in H-1B temporary-worker status. After traveling to India, they returned to the United States on January 17, 2021, and presented their passports and H-1B visas at the San Francisco International Airport.

A Customs and Border Protection officer stamped Mr. Mantripragada’s passport to show admission through October 6, 2021. Ms. Mangasomayajula was sent to secondary inspection, and Mr. Mantripragada later joined her there. Officers questioned both petitioners about how they funded their education and about alleged unauthorized employment while they held student visas. The officers determined that the petitioners were inadmissible for willful misrepresentation and lack of valid documentation, revoked their visas, issued expedited-removal orders, and returned them to New Delhi the same day.

The petition asserted seven claims. Among other things, the petitioners argued that Mr. Mantripragada had been admitted to the United States and therefore was entitled to greater procedural protections; that his visa revocation was unlawful; that the expedited removal violated the Suspension Clause; that the findings of willful misrepresentation violated the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Administrative Procedure Act; and that Ms. Mangasomayajula’s removal was procedurally and substantively flawed. They also sought habeas relief, meaning a court order reviewing allegedly unlawful custody or removal, or alternatively a writ of error coram nobis, an extraordinary corrective writ.

Motion to Dismiss

Respondents moved under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests whether the complaint alleges enough facts and a valid legal theory to support relief. Respondents argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over the expedited-removal challenges and that the petition failed to state a claim. They also raised mootness, the Suspension Clause claim, the Administrative Procedure Act, consular nonreviewability, the availability of coram nobis, and standing as alternative grounds.

The court did not address respondents’ alternative arguments that the habeas claims were moot or barred by consular nonreviewability. The court also did not address the petitioners’ separately filed summary-judgment motion because it presented the same arguments as their opposition to the motion to dismiss.

Whether Mr. Mantripragada Was Admitted

The court rejected the petitioners’ argument that the admission stamp alone established that Mr. Mantripragada had been admitted to the United States. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A), “admitted” means lawful entry after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer. The court explained that entry also requires freedom from official restraint.

The court relied on Ninth Circuit precedent holding that a person must cross into United States territory, undergo inspection and admission or intentionally evade inspection, and be free from official restraint. Mr. Mantripragada went to secondary inspection and, according to the petition, never received an opportunity to leave that area. The court therefore concluded that the passport stamp did not establish admission and that the petitioners had not shown that expedited removal was legally unavailable.

Judicial Review of the Removal Orders

The court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252 sharply limits judicial review of expedited-removal orders. In a habeas proceeding, the court may review only specified matters, including whether the individuals are aliens, whether they were ordered removed under the expedited-removal statute, and whether they are lawful permanent residents, refugees, or asylees. The statute also limits review to whether a removal order was actually issued and related to the petitioner, and it bars review of whether the person was actually inadmissible or entitled to relief from removal.

Because those limited issues were not disputed, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the petitioners’ claims that collaterally attacked the expedited-removal orders and over Mr. Mantripragada’s Suspension Clause claim. The court likewise held that it lacked jurisdiction over the petitioners’ Immigration and Nationality Act and Administrative Procedure Act claims because the immigration statutes precluded the requested judicial review.

Alternative Request for Coram Nobis

The court also granted the motion to dismiss the request for a writ of coram nobis. It explained that the All Writs Act allows such writs only in aid of a court’s existing jurisdiction and does not expand that jurisdiction. The court further noted that coram nobis is an extraordinary remedy generally used to challenge a criminal conviction after the sentence has been served, and that the writ has been abolished in civil cases. The petitioners cited no case issuing coram nobis relief for a deported foreign national.

Disposition

The court granted respondents’ motion to dismiss the petitioners’ claims for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim for relief. It found no basis to conclude that amendment could save the petition. The petition was dismissed without leave to amend, the clerk was directed to enter judgment, and the file was closed.