Navarrette v. Options Recovery Services

Background

Tomas Navarrette, who was proceeding without a lawyer, sued Options Recovery Services, George K.L. Smith, Brianna Herron, and Pamela Thomas. He alleged that he was disabled, had been released from Santa Rita Jail through a mental-health diversion program, and was placed with Options for outpatient services and housing.

Navarrette alleged that Thomas denied his requests for a religious exemption from a 7:00 p.m. curfew and to pray in a particular manner in his shared bedroom. He alleged that Smith and Herron later refused to reschedule his outpatient treatment sessions, preventing him from accepting an offer of full-time work. After he complained about conditions and a house manager to Options and outside agencies, Herron discharged him from Options’ outpatient services, stating that he was in a heightened mental-health state and that Options was not the proper place for him.

The First Amended Complaint asserted 23 causes of action. The first three alleged violations of federal constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a law allowing claims against people who violate federal rights while acting for the government. Other claims arose under the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, a regulation under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, and California law.

Court’s Analysis

The court considered the defendants’ motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not allege enough facts to support a legally recognized claim. The court had previously dismissed Navarrette’s original complaint because it did not adequately allege that the defendants acted under color of state law—that is, with authority or involvement fairly attributable to the government.

The court held that the First through Third causes of action, which were brought under § 1983, again lacked sufficient allegations of government action. Options was a private company, and providing substance-abuse treatment or residential services, including under contracts with government agencies, did not by itself make Options or its employees government actors. The complaint also did not allege that a government employee participated in the challenged conduct.

The court applied the same state-action reasoning to the Eighth Cause of Action, which asserted a claim under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Title II applies to a public entity, and the complaint did not adequately allege that the defendants were acting as one.

The court rejected the defendants’ argument that the other federal claims should be treated as § 1983 claims merely because Navarrette included a reference to § 1983 after citing other statutes and regulations. It treated those references as surplusage, particularly because Navarrette was representing himself. The court’s conclusion therefore denied dismissal of the Fourth through Seventh and Ninth through Fourteenth causes of action.

As to the California claims, the court found that the Twenty-First Cause of Action, based on California’s constitutional free-exercise provision, required government action. The court also found that the Twenty-Third Cause of Action, based on a regulation concerning rights in a state mental-health facility, did not apply to the alleged circumstances involving Options. Those claims were subject to dismissal.

The court further held that the regulations underlying the Nineteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-Second causes of action did not create a private right of action—a right for an individual to sue directly. The regulations instead provided for administrative or agency-initiated enforcement. Those three claims were also subject to dismissal.

Disposition

The court ordered that the motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. It granted the motion as to the First through Third, Eighth, and Nineteenth through Twenty-Third causes of action. It denied the motion in all other respects.

The opinion contains wording in its federal-claims discussion stating that the Fourth through Seventh and Ninth through Fourteenth causes of action were “subject to dismissal,” but its stated conclusion grants dismissal only as to the First through Third, Eighth, and Nineteenth through Twenty-Third causes of action and denies the motion in all other respects.