Johnson v. Federal Aviation Administration

Background

Timothy B. Johnson alleged that he worked as an Air Traffic Manager for the Federal Aviation Administration at the Livermore Air Traffic Control Tower. He alleged that he has Type-2 Diabetes Mellitus, which he claimed was a disability, and that diabetes placed him at increased risk of serious complications from COVID-19.

Johnson alleged that he worked under an approved emergency telework agreement beginning in March 2020. When the Federal Aviation Administration discontinued telework for Air Traffic Managers in his district on June 9, 2020, he was required to return to in-person work. Johnson requested continued remote work as a reasonable accommodation, but the request was denied. He alleged that the alternative accommodations offered still required him to work at the tower and that he eventually used his accrued leave and took early retirement, which he characterized as a discriminatory constructive termination.

His first amended complaint asserted eight claims: disability discrimination, retaliation, and constructive discharge under the Rehabilitation Act; race-based and retaliatory hostile work environment claims under Title VII; two race-discrimination claims under Title VII; and a race-based constructive-discharge claim under Title VII. The defendant moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim, to dismiss part of the disability-discrimination claim and all other claims challenged in the motion.

Court’s Analysis

The court held that the Rehabilitation Act disability-discrimination claim was insufficiently pleaded to the extent it relied on a disparate-treatment theory—meaning that Johnson was treated adversely because of his disability. The court accepted that the amended complaint adequately alleged that Johnson had a disability and was qualified to perform his job with or without an accommodation. But it found that the allegations that his disability motivated the defendant’s actions were conclusory and lacked facts supporting a reasonable inference of discrimination. The defendant did not seek dismissal of Johnson’s separate failure-to-accommodate theory.

The court granted dismissal of the Rehabilitation Act retaliation claim. It found that Johnson adequately alleged that requesting a reasonable accommodation was protected activity and that he suffered adverse actions, including using leave and being constructively discharged. But the court found no facts plausibly linking those actions to his accommodation requests.

The court found that Johnson failed to state either hostile-work-environment claim. For the race-based claim, the amended complaint did not support an inference that the denial or delay of the accommodation was because of race and did not identify sufficiently severe or pervasive race-based conduct. For the retaliatory hostile-work-environment claim, the complaint did not allege that the delay or denial was retaliation for activity protected under Title VII, as opposed to activity protected under the Rehabilitation Act.

The court also dismissed both constructive-discharge claims. It explained that constructive discharge requires working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign and that this standard is higher than the standard for a hostile work environment. The court found that the amended complaint relied solely on the denial of remote work and alleged no additional aggravating factors.

Finally, the court dismissed both Title VII race-discrimination claims. Johnson alleged that other employees were allowed to telework or receive Weather and Safety Leave, but he did not identify their races or positions. The court found that the amended complaint did not identify a non-African-American employee who was similarly situated and treated more favorably.

Disposition

Johnson requested another opportunity to amend. The court noted that he had already amended once after being instructed to plead his best case, and that his counsel could not identify additional facts that could support the deficient claims. The court therefore dismissed all claims in the first amended complaint with prejudice except the Rehabilitation Act failure-to-accommodate claim.

Judge Donna Ryu granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The sole remaining claim is Johnson’s Rehabilitation Act claim based on failure to accommodate.