Ketroser v. 7-Eleven, Inc.
- Maxine Chesney
- 3:19-cv-05231
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 4
In Ketroser v. 7-Eleven, Inc., Judge Chesney denied Ketroser’s motion to add allegations based on a late store visit.
Deidre Kellogg Ketroser, 7-Eleven, Inc., and Southland Corp.; the order governs whether Ketroser could add late allegations to the pleadings.
What happened
In Ketroser v. 7-Eleven, Inc., Deidre Kellogg Ketroser asked to add allegations based on a November 2022 visit to a 7-Eleven store. Her existing claims concern alleged access barriers involving an exterior door and interior aisles.
The court said no pleading change was needed for the door issue because it would consider the relevant evidence about 7-Eleven’s automatic-door installation and Ketroser’s observations. For the aisle issue, the court found that 7-Eleven had not agreed to litigate the new barriers and that adding them after discovery and near the end of trial would cause unfair delay and prejudice.
Judge Chesney denied Ketroser’s motion for leave to file a Second Supplemental Third Amended Complaint.
The detailed version
- Ketroser v. 7-Eleven, Inc. · No. 3:19-cv-05231
- Maxine Chesney
- Dec. 22, 2022
Background
Deidre Kellogg Ketroser, who requires a walker and cane for mobility, sued 7-Eleven, Inc. and Southland Corp. over alleged access barriers at a 7-Eleven store in San Ramon, California, during visits in December 2018 and February 2019. Her operative complaint asserted claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Unruh Civil Rights Act. The claims relevant to this motion involved alleged excessive operating pressure on the exterior doors and an alleged obstruction of the interior aisles.
Ketroser sought permission under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) and Rule 15(d) to file a Second Supplemental Third Amended Complaint. The proposed pleading added allegations based on a November 5, 2022 visit to the store.
Exterior Door
The court ruled that no amendment or supplemental pleading was necessary concerning the door claim. After discovery ended, 7-Eleven was allowed to present evidence about its installation of an automatic door and whether that change made the door claim no longer live. Ketroser was allowed to present her testimony and her expert’s testimony about the claimed remediation. The court stated that it would consider this evidence in deciding the door issues. It found that changing the pleadings at that stage would add an unnecessary layer to the case.
Interior Aisles
For the aisle claim, the court rejected Ketroser’s argument under Rule 15(b), which can treat an issue as part of the case when the parties expressly or implicitly agreed to try it. The court found that 7-Eleven did not agree to litigate barriers beyond those identified in the operative complaint and had objected before and during trial to evidence about those additional barriers.
The court also rejected the request under Rule 15(d), which allows a court, on fair terms and with reasonable notice, to permit a pleading about events occurring after the original pleading. The court explained that supplemental pleadings cannot introduce a separate and new cause of action, or add evidence supporting an existing claim when the evidence was obtained or offered too late or would unfairly harm the opposing party.
The court found that Ketroser unduly delayed obtaining the new evidence and that 7-Eleven would be unfairly prejudiced by having to address it months after fact and expert discovery had closed and five days after the defense had rested. The court noted that Ketroser or her expert could have visited the store during discovery and disclosed the evidence before discovery ended.
Disposition
Judge Maxine M. Chesney denied Ketroser’s motion for leave to file a Second Supplemental Third Amended Complaint. The opinion did not decide the underlying disability claims in this order.
Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.