Williams v. Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC

Background

Peter Todd Williams, Ph.D., represented himself in a retaliation claim under the False Claims Act against his former employer, Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS). LLNS operates the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for the U.S. Department of Energy. Williams worked as a design physicist from January 2016 until LLNS fired him in May 2017. He was a probationary employee during that period.

Williams challenged the scientific methods used in a model developed by another LLNS scientist, Dr. Peter Vitello. He believed the model used a jagged rate curve with many parameters and was not supported by experimental results. Before his firing, Williams raised concerns about the model with several LLNS scientists and supervisors, proposed an alternative model, and gave a presentation criticizing the model’s reliability and trustworthiness. The opinion states that Williams did not use terms such as “unlawful” or “illegal,” probably did not use the word “fraud,” and did not tell anyone at LLNS that he believed Vitello was cheating the government out of funds.

Williams became aware of the False Claims Act after he was fired. The court described evidence that his theory connecting the scientific work to fraud against the government developed over time after his termination. Williams later filed this action, ultimately pursuing only a retaliation claim rather than a claim seeking recovery of money for the government.

Parties’ Arguments

LLNS sought summary judgment. Summary judgment is a ruling entered without a trial when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a fact important to the claim and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LLNS argued that Williams could not show protected activity because he did not subjectively believe, when he raised his concerns, that LLNS was potentially defrauding the government. LLNS also argued that a reasonable employee in his circumstances could not have viewed the alleged scientific errors as fraud and that LLNS had no reason to know Williams was investigating government fraud.

Williams argued that he knew LLNS’s work on the W80-4 weapon was funded by the Department of Energy and believed Vitello’s models were important to that work. He maintained that the seriousness of the alleged scientific problems, his efforts to develop an alternative model, and his concerns about retaliation gave LLNS sufficient notice of protected conduct. He also argued that the False Claims Act does not require specific words such as “fraud.”

Legal Standard and Analysis

The court explained that a retaliation claim under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) requires proof that: (1) the employee engaged in activity protected by the Act; (2) the employer knew about that protected activity; and (3) the employer discriminated against the employee because of it. Protected activity includes lawful efforts to stop or investigate possible fraud against the government. The employee must have acted in good faith and a reasonable employee in the same or similar circumstances must have been able to believe that the employer was possibly committing such fraud. Specific awareness of the False Claims Act is not required, but the investigation must be connected to a potential False Claims Act case.

The court held that Williams had not shown the required subjective belief. His evidence showed that he believed Vitello’s work was unscientific or incompetent, but the court found that this was not the same as believing the work involved fraud against the government. The court relied in part on Williams’s testimony that he had not accused anyone of fraud while employed and on evidence that his funding-related theory arose after he was fired. The court also noted that mistakes, negligence, and scientific errors are not automatically fraud under the False Claims Act.

The court separately held that Williams had not shown LLNS’s knowledge of protected activity. The relevant LLNS employees stated that they understood Williams to be criticizing the scientific merits of Vitello’s model, not accusing anyone of fraud or investigating false claims against the government. The court stated that an employee need not use particular legal language, but must provide some connection to fraudulent or false claims against the government. Williams’s disagreement with the model and work on an alternative model did not, without more, create a reasonable inference that LLNS knew he was pursuing a False Claims Act matter.

Because Williams failed to provide evidence of his contemporaneous belief that LLNS was defrauding the government, and separately failed to provide evidence that LLNS knew he was engaged in protected conduct, the court granted LLNS summary judgment on Williams’s sole retaliation claim. The court did not reach the separate question of whether a reasonable employee in Williams’s position might have believed that fraud was occurring. It also did not decide the merits of Vitello’s model or the reason Williams was fired.

Other Motions and Disposition

Both parties moved to exclude the opposing expert’s opinions about whether a reasonable employee in Williams’s position would have believed LLNS scientists were engaged in fraud against the government. Because the court did not decide that objective-reasonableness question, it held that the expert testimony was not relevant to the outcome and denied both motions to exclude as moot.

The court granted LLNS’s motion for summary judgment. It directed the Clerk to enter judgment in favor of LLNS and close the case.