Cannon v. San Francisco Police Department

Background

Lady Benjamin Cannon initially sued 23 named defendants and 60 unnamed “Doe” defendants concerning what she alleged was an unlawful eviction, among other acts. She was allowed to proceed without paying filing fees, but a magistrate judge found her original complaint deficient. Cannon then filed a First Amended Complaint. The court screened that amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), which requires dismissal of claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek relief from an immune defendant.

Cannon voluntarily dismissed her claims against Carlos Jato, Daniel Berko, and the Law Offices of Carlos Jato. The court reviewed the claims against the remaining parties.

Rule 8

The court held that the amended complaint did not satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires a short, plain, simple, concise, and direct statement of the claims. Cannon made blanket allegations that all defendants helped one another commit all of the alleged violations, but she did not provide specific facts connecting each defendant to particular wrongdoing. The court warned that a second amended complaint must comply with Rule 8 or it will again be dismissed.

Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 creates a claim for violating rights protected by the Constitution or federal law when the violation is committed by someone acting under color of state law—that is, using governmental authority or acting in a legally sufficient connection with the state.

The court dismissed Cannon’s first through fifth § 1983 claims against Jadallah; Provencio; Watters; Wiseblood; McClain; Thompson; Bledsoe, Diestel, Treppa & Crane LLP; Riley; Hain; Ryan Murphy; Kavin Williams; Eviction Defense Collaborative; Friendly Movers; and Does 1–60. Cannon identified these defendants as private parties, apart from the municipal entities and Maron, Sanford, and Baumgartner, and did not allege facts showing that the private defendants acted under color of state law. Her conclusory allegation that all defendants supported state actors was insufficient.

The court also dismissed Cannon’s first, second, fourth, and fifth claims against the City and County of San Francisco, the San Francisco Police Department, and the San Francisco Sheriff’s Department. Local governments can be liable under § 1983 when a constitutional injury is caused by an official policy or custom, but Cannon did not allege that the asserted violations resulted from such a policy or custom. The court dismissed her third claim, which alleged failure to train, because she pleaded only the elements of the claim and no facts showing deliberate indifference by the local government entities.

Cannon did not specify whether she sued the alleged government officials in their official or personal capacities. The court explained that official-capacity claims are treated as claims against the agencies the officials represent and failed for the reasons stated above. As to personal-capacity claims, the court dismissed claims against Captain Maron, Captain Sanford, and Ms. Baumgartner where Cannon did not provide specific allegations supporting her first, second, and fifth claims as to those officials. The court also dismissed the claim against Baumgartner based on supervisory liability because Cannon did not allege that Baumgartner was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation or had a sufficient causal connection to it.

The court dismissed Cannon’s failure-to-train claim against the officials because her allegations were conclusory. It also dismissed her excessive-force claim under the Fourth Amendment because, although she alleged that Baumgartner sanctioned lethal force and that Maron and Sanford threatened arrest and the use of agents, she did not allege that force was actually used against her.

State-Law Claims

Cannon also asserted state-law claims for conversion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and defamation. After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, meaning authority to hear related state-law claims in the same case, over those state-law claims.

Watters’s Motions and Disposition

Defendant Watters filed ten motions, several of which the court described as duplicative. Because the court was dismissing Cannon’s claims, it denied Watters’s motions as moot.

The court dismissed the complaint without prejudice and allowed Cannon to file a second amended complaint by March 7, 2023. The order stated that failure to file it by that date would result in dismissal with prejudice. The court separately denied Watters’s motions as moot.