Gilmore v. Silva

Background

C. Dwayne Gilmore, who was incarcerated at Pelican Bay State Prison, sued C. Silva, G. Abdullah, R. Losacco, C.E. Ducart, R. Tupy, and the Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The opinion describes claims under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.

Gilmore alleged that, for a period in 2014 and 2015, his assignment as a barber prevented him from attending Jumu’ah, or Friday Muslim prayer services. Pelican Bay required inmates to remain in their assigned programming unless they had a movement permit called a “ducat.” During the transition from paper permits to an electronic system called the Strategic Offender Management System, staff could not issue a religious-services permit to an inmate assigned to work that day. Gilmore’s Friday work schedule therefore conflicted with Jumu’ah.

Gilmore filed prison grievances. After he appealed to the second level of review, officials began arranging a job adjustment. By February 27, 2015, his schedule had been changed so that he could regularly attend Jumu’ah services. A later prison response stated that he was attending Friday services. Gilmore nevertheless pursued his claims, including a request for relief based on the period when he could not attend services.

First Amendment claim

The court applied the rule that a prison restriction affecting religious practice is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate prison interests. The court considered the prison’s stated reasons for controlling inmate movement, including safety and institutional security, as well as the alternative religious practices available to Gilmore.

The court held that Gilmore’s First Amendment claim failed on the merits. It found that he could pray in his cell and practice other aspects of his religion, while the ducat rules were adopted to promote inmate safety and institutional security. Relying on Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit decisions, the court concluded that the prison’s explanation was rational and reasonably related to security needs, even though the policy temporarily prevented Gilmore from attending Jumu’ah.

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act claim

The court held that Gilmore’s claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act was moot, meaning that the requested court relief could no longer provide a live remedy. The technical problem had been resolved, and Pelican Bay had arranged for Gilmore to attend Jumu’ah. The court also noted that Gilmore had left Pelican Bay and was incarcerated at Centinela State Prison. An injunction directed to Pelican Bay employees would not affect him, while an injunction involving employees at the other prison would involve people outside this court’s jurisdiction.

The court therefore concluded that Gilmore was not entitled to an injunction and that his Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act claim failed. Because the First Amendment and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act claims were dispositive, the court did not decide defendants’ additional arguments concerning qualified immunity, official-capacity claims, or personal involvement. It stated that the official-capacity claims and claims against California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation officials failed along with the other claims.

Disposition

The court denied Gilmore’s motion for summary judgment and granted defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment. The clerk was ordered to enter judgment and close the file. The opinion is signed by Judge White; the supplied text does not clearly show the judge’s full first and middle names.