Roffman v. REBBL, INC.
- Jeffrey White
- 4:22-cv-05290
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 10
In Roffman v. REBBL, INC., Judge White partly granted and partly denied REBBL’s motion to dismiss claims challenging protein labeling.
Mehva Roffman, her proposed classes, and REBBL, INC. The ruling dismissed some theories and claims while allowing other theories to proceed at that stage, subject to amendment.
What happened
In Roffman v. REBBL, INC., Mehva Roffman alleged that REBBL’s beverages misleadingly claimed to contain 16 grams of protein because the products’ pea protein was not fully digestible. She brought claims under California consumer-protection laws and common law on behalf of herself and proposed classes.
The court found that Roffman could seek an injunction and could pursue claims involving similar products she did not buy. It dismissed claims based on the front-label protein claim because federal law barred them, but denied REBBL’s request regarding other labeling theories without prejudice. The court also granted part of REBBL’s request concerning monetary remedies and dismissed the unjust-enrichment claim, allowing Roffman to amend.
Judge White ordered the motion to dismiss granted in part and denied in part. He gave Roffman until February 22, 2023, to file an amended complaint if she chose to do so.
The detailed version
- Roffman v. REBBL, INC. · No. 4:22-cv-05290
- Jeffrey White
- Jan. 31, 2023
Background
REBBL manufactures, advertises, distributes, and sells Plant Powered Elixir beverages. Roffman alleged that she purchased the Dark Chocolate, Vanilla, and Coffee flavors, whose front labels stated that they contained 16 grams of protein. She claimed that the labels were misleading and unlawful because pea protein, the products’ primary protein source, is not fully digestible, so the amount of protein usable by the human body was substantially lower than the amount stated.
Roffman also alleged that REBBL’s Nutrition Facts Panels did not state the corrected amount of protein per serving as a percentage of daily value. She asserted claims under California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act, False Advertising Law, and Unfair Competition Law, along with common-law fraud and unjust enrichment claims, for herself and proposed classes.
Standing
REBBL moved to dismiss for lack of Article III standing and for failure to state a claim. The court rejected REBBL’s argument that Roffman lacked standing to seek injunctive relief because she now knew about the alleged labeling problem. Roffman alleged that the product formulas could change and that she could not determine the amount of digestible protein without buying the products. The court held that these allegations sufficiently supported a possible future injury.
The court also held that Roffman had standing to pursue claims concerning products she did not purchase. It followed the approach used by most courts in the district, under which a plaintiff may pursue claims involving unpurchased products when the products and alleged misrepresentations are substantially similar. The court found Roffman’s allegations sufficient at this stage.
Federal Preemption
Federal preemption is a legal rule that can bar state-law claims when federal law displaces them. Roffman advanced three labeling theories: (1) REBBL unlawfully omitted the corrected protein percentage from the Nutrition Facts Panel; (2) that omission made the front-label statement misleading; and (3) the front-label protein claim was inherently misleading because it used the nitrogen method without accounting for protein quality.
Roffman conceded that the third theory—the Front Label Protein Claim—was preempted. The court therefore dismissed claims based on that theory with prejudice.
The court held that the first theory, concerning the alleged omission of the corrected protein percentage, was not expressly preempted. It also held that Roffman’s theory that the omission made the labels unlawful was not impliedly preempted. Roffman disclaimed any direct claim under the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and its regulations, and instead relied on those requirements as part of her state-law claims.
The court described the preemption question concerning the theory that the omission made the labels misleading as closer and noted disagreement among courts. It denied REBBL’s motion to dismiss claims based on that theory without prejudice, allowing REBBL to renew the argument in a motion for summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings.
Equitable Relief and Unjust Enrichment
REBBL argued that Roffman had not adequately alleged that her legal remedies, such as damages, were inadequate. The court agreed that her allegations were conditional and did not establish that damages would necessarily be inadequate or incomplete. It granted REBBL’s motion in part and allowed Roffman to amend her allegations concerning the inadequacy of her legal remedies.
The court also granted REBBL’s motion to dismiss the unjust-enrichment claim, with leave to amend, because Roffman had not alleged facts showing that her legal remedies were inadequate.
Disposition
The court granted in part and denied in part REBBL’s motion to dismiss. It dismissed the claims based on the front-label protein theory with prejudice; denied the motion without prejudice as to the specified Nutrition Facts Panel omission theory; granted part of the motion concerning the adequacy of legal remedies with leave to amend; and dismissed the unjust-enrichment claim with leave to amend. If Roffman amended, the court required her to file an amended complaint by February 22, 2023.
Read the full 10-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.