Batis v. Dun & Bradstreet Holdings, Inc.

Background

Dun & Bradstreet Holdings, Inc. owns and operates the D&B Hoovers database. According to the complaint, the database contains names and personal information for hundreds of millions of people, including millions of Californians, and is sold to salespeople and marketers.

Batis alleged that, during a free trial of D&B Hoovers, users could view a profile containing her name, job title, workplace, telephone number, work colleagues, and other information. Users who wanted to download her profile or view it after the free trial were told to purchase a subscription. Batis alleged that she had not consented to Dun & Bradstreet’s use of her name, personal information, or persona to advertise subscriptions.

Batis asserted three claims on her own behalf and on behalf of a putative California class: violation of California Civil Code § 3344, a common-law claim for appropriation of her name or likeness, and violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law.

Dun & Bradstreet’s Motions

Dun & Bradstreet filed a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute and, alternatively, moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(1) addresses subject-matter jurisdiction, including constitutional standing. Rule 12(b)(6) tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. An anti-SLAPP motion is a procedure for challenging claims arising from protected speech or petitioning activity.

Standing

Dun & Bradstreet argued that Batis lacked Article III standing because she had not alleged a legally cognizable injury. The court rejected that argument. It found that Batis’s alleged injuries—including unauthorized use of her name and likeness, commercial exploitation of her persona, invasion of her right to control commercial use of her identity, and mental or emotional harm—were sufficiently concrete for purposes of standing.

The court also rejected Dun & Bradstreet’s argument that Batis needed to allege that her persona had independent commercial value or that the use suggested her personal endorsement. The court concluded that the alleged commercial exploitation itself was enough at this stage. It therefore denied the Rule 12(b)(1) motion.

Rule 12(b)(6) Motion

Dun & Bradstreet argued that Batis’s claims failed under California law. The court explained that California recognizes both a common-law right to prevent commercial appropriation of a person’s name or likeness and a statutory right of publicity under Civil Code § 3344. The court found that Dun & Bradstreet had not shown that Batis’s allegations failed under either theory. It also found that Dun & Bradstreet had not established that Batis’s Unfair Competition Law claim failed on the same grounds.

Dun & Bradstreet separately argued that the First Amendment barred Batis’s publicity and misappropriation claims. The court agreed that the D&B Hoovers database itself was similar to directories and other publications that receive First Amendment protection. But the court distinguished the database from the alleged advertising use of Batis’s profile to promote subscriptions.

The court explained that Dun & Bradstreet’s First Amendment argument relied on an affirmative defense, meaning a defense that may defeat a claim even if the complaint’s allegations are otherwise sufficient. Such a defense can support dismissal at the pleading stage only when the complaint itself shows that the defense necessarily bars recovery. Because the complaint did not provide enough facts to determine whether the database was a transformative or expressive work in the way Dun & Bradstreet claimed, the court found dismissal improper. It denied the Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

Anti-SLAPP Motion

The court found that Dun & Bradstreet had not made the required initial showing that Batis’s claims arose from protected activity connected to a public issue or issue of public interest. Although the information in Batis’s profile could be described as business information, the court concluded that a broad assertion of public interest was insufficient. Batis was challenging the commercial use of her profile to advertise subscriptions, not merely her inclusion in the database.

Because Dun & Bradstreet failed to satisfy the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the court did not need to decide whether Batis had shown a probability of prevailing on her claims. The court denied the anti-SLAPP motion to strike.

Disposition

The court’s conclusion states: “D&B’s motion to strike, and, in the alternative, to dismiss the Complaint is hereby DENIED.”