Joseph v. City of San Jose
- Robert Illman
- 1:19-cv-01294
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 20
In Rhawn Joseph v. City of San Jose, Judge Illman granted Defendants’ summary-judgment motion, denied Joseph’s two motions, and entered judgment for Defendants.
Rhawn Joseph lost his remaining claims at summary judgment. The City of San Jose and the other defendants obtained judgment as a matter of law; the court did not rule on their qualified-immunity arguments.
What happened
Rhawn Joseph sued the City of San Jose and other defendants after city officials cited him over fence panels, fence height, and overgrown trees. Joseph said the enforcement violated his constitutional rights, including rights involving religion, speech, searches, due process, and fines.
The court found that Joseph received notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to appeal; was not fined; was not forced to cut his trees; and had no evidence of trespassing, bribery, threats, or coercion. The court also found that his evidence did not create a real factual dispute supporting his remaining claims.
Judge Illman granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denied Joseph’s two motions for summary judgment. The court did not decide Defendants’ qualified-immunity arguments because judgment had already been entered for them on all claims.
The detailed version
- Joseph v. City of San Jose · No. 1:19-cv-01294
- Robert Illman
- Feb. 13, 2023
Background
Rhawn Joseph proceeded without a lawyer. The dispute began after a neighbor’s lighting allegedly illuminated part of Joseph’s home and property. Joseph installed three polyurethane panels near or atop his fence to block the light. San Jose code-enforcement officials later cited Joseph based on alleged violations involving the panels, fence height, and cypress trees.
Joseph removed the panels, lowered part of his fence, and pruned vines before an administrative hearing. A hearing officer affirmed some code violations and required additional corrective action, but the city appeals board later dismissed Joseph’s appeal as moot after finding that his property complied with the code. The opinion states that Joseph was never assessed a fine or fee, was never required to cut or remove his cypress trees, and admitted that he suffered no physical, mental, or emotional injury. He also admitted that he had no evidence that inspectors entered his property or that an inspector asked him for a bribe.
Earlier rulings and summary-judgment standard
The opinion notes that Judge Koh had previously dismissed several claims with prejudice, including Joseph’s second claim in its entirety and parts of his first, third, and ninth claims. Judge Koh also dismissed Joseph’s twelfth claim without prejudice, and Joseph did not amend or reassert it. The present order addressed the claims that remained.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court concluded that Joseph had not identified competent evidence creating a genuine factual dispute on any remaining claim.
First claim: religion and speech
Joseph argued that his trees expressed his religious beliefs and that enforcement of the city’s tree regulations violated the First Amendment’s protections for religious exercise and speech. The court held that the city’s rules were valid, neutral rules that applied generally and did not impose a substantial burden on Joseph’s beliefs as described in his deposition. The court also found that Joseph had not shown that the city’s actions actually interfered with his beliefs, particularly because he was not required to cut his trees and was never fined for them.
The court separately held that the unfettered growth of Joseph’s 12 cypress trees was not sufficiently communicative to receive free-speech protection. Joseph had not shown that he intended the trees’ growth to convey a particular message or that viewers would likely understand one. Defendants were therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the First Amendment claim.
Third claim: Fourth Amendment and alleged bribery
Joseph alleged that Inspectors Gibilisco and Flanigan solicited a bribe, attempted extortion, and seized his cypress trees. The court explained that alleged bribery and extortion are not Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure issues. It further relied on Joseph’s admissions that no inspector entered his property, Gibilisco did not ask him for money, and no one seized his trees or other property. The court granted Defendants judgment as a matter of law on this claim.
Fourth and fifth claims: due process and confrontation
Joseph claimed that the administrative proceedings violated due process and that he was denied a Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. The court held that Joseph received adequate notice, attended the hearing, presented documents and arguments, could have presented witnesses, and had an avenue of appeal. Because Joseph had not identified a defect in the notice or procedures, and because he suffered no property or personal injury, the court granted Defendants judgment on the due-process claim.
The court held that the Sixth Amendment confrontation right applies in criminal prosecutions, not civil proceedings such as Joseph’s administrative code-enforcement hearing. Even construing this claim as a due-process claim, the court found no genuine factual dispute because Joseph received the hearing and procedural opportunities required by law. The opinion’s heading refers to a “fifth claim,” while the text describes the confrontation claim as his sixth claim.
Sixth through eleventh claims
The court rejected Joseph’s excessive-fines claim because he was never assessed any fine or fee. It rejected the seventh claim because it repeated other claims, alleged no evidence supporting discrimination, and included allegations of bribery and extortion contradicted by Joseph’s testimony.
The court rejected the eighth claim for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Joseph had not provided concrete facts or evidence showing that a city policy, practice, custom, or failure to train caused a constitutional violation. The court also granted judgment on the surviving part of the ninth claim under California’s Bane Civil Rights Act because Joseph offered no evidence of interference with his rights through threats, intimidation, or coercion.
Finally, the court granted judgment on the tenth and eleventh claims, which alleged negligence, willful indifference, intentional infliction of emotional distress, malice, and harassment. The court found that these claims were supported only by conclusory allegations and that Joseph’s opposition did not address them, indicating that he had abandoned them.
Qualified immunity and disposition
Defendants also argued that qualified immunity protected them. Qualified immunity is a protection that can shield government officials from damages liability in some civil-rights cases. The court did not decide that issue because Defendants had already obtained judgment on every claim based on Joseph’s failure to present evidence creating a genuine factual dispute.
The court granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Joseph’s two Motions for Summary Judgment. It stated that a separate judgment would issue. Judge Robert M. Illman signed the order on February 13, 2023.
Read the full 20-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.