Smith v. Diaz
- Haywood Gilliam
- 4:20-cv-04335
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 11
In Smith v. Diaz, Judge Gilliam denied prison officials’ motion to dismiss C. Jay Smith’s Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim.
C. Jay Smith’s Eighth Amendment claim against Ralph Diaz and Davis was allowed to proceed past the motion-to-dismiss stage.
What happened
In C. Jay Smith v. Ralph Diaz, et al., Smith alleged that California prison officials failed to implement protections for transgender people in custody, creating risks of sexual assault, harassment, and stalking. She brought an Eighth Amendment claim against Ralph Diaz and Davis for failing to protect her.
Diaz and Davis argued that Smith had not alleged enough facts showing they knew about and ignored a serious risk or that their actions caused her injuries. Smith alleged that Davis reviewed complaints and attended meetings where transgender inmates raised shower-privacy concerns. She alleged that Diaz was responsible for CDCR policies that used “opposite biological sex” instead of “opposite gender,” allowing transgender women to be viewed while showering.
The court found the allegations sufficient at the motion-to-dismiss stage and denied the motion. Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. concluded that Smith plausibly alleged deliberate indifference, a serious risk to her safety, and a connection between the officials’ policies and the stalking and harassment she described.
The detailed version
- Smith v. Diaz · No. 4:20-cv-04335
- Haywood Gilliam
- Feb. 22, 2023
Background
C. Jay Smith, an incarcerated transgender woman, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims against state actors for violating constitutional rights. The opinion addresses only the renewed motion to dismiss her Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against Ralph Diaz and Davis. Smith alleged that, while she was incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison, she experienced assault, discrimination, harassment, and threats of retaliation related to her gender expression and identity.
Smith alleged that Diaz, who was the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation during the relevant period, and Davis, who was the Warden of San Quentin, failed to implement provisions of the federal Prison Rape Elimination Act. According to the amended complaint, those failures included not implementing adequate screening, search, housing, and shower protections for transgender people in custody. Smith alleged that the lack of shower privacy increased the risk of sexual assault, harassment, and stalking, and that she was stalked and harassed after another incarcerated person was allowed to watch her shower.
Legal standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may seek dismissal for failure to state a legally sufficient claim. At this stage, the court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and views them in the plaintiff’s favor, but it does not accept conclusory statements or unreasonable inferences. To proceed, the complaint must allege enough facts to make the claim plausible.
For an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege both an objectively serious risk or deprivation and that the defendant knew of and disregarded a substantial risk to the plaintiff’s health or safety. A supervisory official may also be liable under § 1983 if the official personally participated in the violation or implemented a deficient policy that was the moving force behind the constitutional injury.
Court’s analysis
As to Davis, the court found that Smith plausibly alleged direct deliberate indifference. Smith alleged that Davis chaired the Institutional PREA Review Committee, reviewed complaints and data about PREA noncompliance, and attended meetings in 2018 and 2019 where transgender inmates, including Smith, raised concerns about shower privacy. The court concluded that these allegations plausibly showed Davis knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate safety.
The court also found that Smith plausibly alleged an objectively serious harm. The amended complaint alleged that she was forced to shower with dozens of men in custody or in direct view of others, and that prison officials changed policies involving separate shower times for transgender women. The court stated that the alleged environment violated transgender inmates’ privacy rights and exposed them to an increased risk of sexual assault, harassment, or stalking.
As to Diaz, Smith did not allege that he personally reviewed complaints or attended the meetings where shower-privacy concerns were raised. The court therefore evaluated whether she plausibly alleged that Diaz was connected to a deficient policy that was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. The court found that, although it was a close question, Smith alleged enough to proceed at this stage.
Smith alleged that CDCR’s written policy differed from the federal PREA rules by using “opposite biological sex” rather than “opposite gender” in its shower-privacy provision. She alleged that this difference systematically discriminated against transgender inmates and allowed transgender women to be forced to shower with or in view of men. She also alleged that Diaz had ultimate responsibility for CDCR’s policies and approved and published annual PREA reports identifying the deficiency.
The court further found that Smith plausibly alleged causation, meaning a connection between the challenged policy and her injury. The court reasoned that the harm described in the PREA rules—the safety risk from cross-gender viewing in showers—was the same type of harm Smith alleged occurred when an incarcerated man watched her shower and then stalked and harassed her. The court stated that whether the facts ultimately establish liability is a question for a later stage, not the motion-to-dismiss stage.
Disposition
The court DENIED Defendants’ renewed motion to dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim. It also set a case-management conference for March 7, 2023, and directed the parties to submit a joint case-management statement by February 28, 2023.
Read the full 11-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.