Regal v. County of Santa Clara

Background

Frederick Inea Regal was arrested on July 28, 2020, after San Jose police officers observed signs that he was under the influence of a controlled substance. He told the officers he might be having delusions and wanted to speak with a psychiatrist at the jail. A jail intake assessment recorded a history of mood swings and depression, suicidal thoughts, and apparent detoxification.

Regal was placed alone in a cell that had bed linens and an upper bunk that could be used as a hanging point. The cell was outside deputies’ direct view and had no video or audio monitoring. He was scheduled for checks every 15 minutes. On July 29, 2020, therapist Consuelo Garcia spoke with Regal during one of those checks. Her progress note quoted him as saying, “Yes I’m suicidal” and “I’m depressed.” About an hour later, a correctional officer found Regal hanging from a bed sheet attached to the upper bunk. He was placed on life support and died on August 5, 2020.

Devin Regal, E.R., and C.R., suing individually and as successors in interest to Regal, alleged that the County, former Sheriff Laurie Smith, and Garcia were deliberately indifferent to Regal’s medical and mental-health needs. They asserted five claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: deliberate indifference under the Fourteenth Amendment; loss of familial association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments; and three claims against the County based on an unconstitutional policy or custom, failure to train, and ratification. They also asserted a Title II Americans with Disabilities Act claim against the County.

Motion to dismiss and Claim 1

The defendants moved to dismiss all claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to support a legally recognized claim. The court granted the defendants’ request to take judicial notice of four County policies, but only for the limited purpose of providing context.

For a pretrial detainee’s deliberate-indifference claim against an individual defendant, the complaint must allege that the defendant intentionally made a decision about the detainee’s conditions, those conditions created a substantial risk of serious harm, the defendant failed to take objectively reasonable available measures to reduce that risk, and the failure caused the injury.

As to Garcia, the court found that the complaint did not clearly allege whether she had made the original housing decision or had authority to move Regal, remove the linens, order more frequent checks, or take other protective measures. The plaintiffs argued that County policies gave mental-health staff authority to take such steps, but those facts were not in the complaint. The court therefore granted dismissal of Claim 1 against Garcia with leave to amend. It rejected the defendants’ argument that the claim was merely a medical-negligence claim, noting that the plaintiffs’ theory went beyond an allegation of simple carelessness.

As to Smith, the court found that the complaint did not allege facts showing she was personally involved in Regal’s housing or knew about him. The complaint also did not clearly identify the allegedly deficient checking policy, show that Smith was responsible for it, or connect that policy to the decisions that allegedly led to Regal’s death. The court granted dismissal of Claim 1 against Smith with leave to amend.

Claim 2 and qualified immunity

The loss-of-familial-association claim alleged that Garcia and Smith’s deliberate indifference interfered with the plaintiffs’ relationship with their father. Because the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged deliberate indifference, the court also granted dismissal of Claim 2 against Garcia and Smith with leave to amend.

Garcia and Smith separately argued that qualified immunity protected them from damages. Qualified immunity generally protects government officials unless their conduct violated a federal right that was clearly established at the time. The court found that the defendants had described the plaintiffs’ theory too narrowly by focusing only on the 15-minute checking schedule. The plaintiffs’ broader theory included Regal’s solitary placement in a cell with linens and a hanging point, outside deputies’ view, with allegedly insufficient monitoring.

Because the plaintiffs had not yet alleged those claims with enough detail, the court said it could not evaluate qualified immunity at that stage. It denied the motion to dismiss Claims 1 and 2 on qualified-immunity grounds, without prejudice to renewing that argument after the plaintiffs clarified their claims.

Claims against the County

Claims 3 through 5 were municipal-liability claims against the County under § 1983. Such claims require allegations that a constitutional right was violated, the County had a policy or practice, the policy or practice reflected deliberate indifference to the right, and it caused the constitutional violation.

For the policy-or-custom claim, the plaintiffs did not clearly identify whether they relied on a written policy or an informal practice, or explain whether Garcia acted under that policy or practice. For the failure-to-train claim, they did not identify what training the County provided, how it was inadequate, or how it caused Regal’s death. For the ratification claim, they did not identify a final County policymaker who ratified specific conduct. The court granted dismissal of Claims 3, 4, and 5 with leave to amend.

ADA claim

The ADA claim alleged that Regal had a qualifying mental-health disability and that the County denied him a reasonable accommodation by placing him alone in a cell with a means of hanging himself and without adequate monitoring. The County did not dispute, for purposes of the motion, that Regal was disabled.

The court held that the complaint did not allege facts suggesting the County denied Regal treatment or another benefit because of his disability. Instead, the complaint alleged that the County addressed his mental-health needs by implementing 15-minute checks. The court stated that alleging those measures were inadequate did not by itself establish an ADA claim. It granted dismissal of Claim 6 against the County without leave to amend.

Disposition

Judge Beth Labson Freeman ordered that the motion to dismiss be granted in part and denied in part, with leave to amend in part and without leave to amend in part. Claims 1 through 5 were dismissed for failure to allege enough facts to state a claim, with leave to amend. The motion to dismiss Claims 1 and 2 on qualified-immunity grounds was denied. Claim 6 was dismissed without leave to amend. Any amended complaint was due by March 29, 2023, and amendment was limited to the deficiencies identified in the order; the plaintiffs could not add new parties or claims without prior court permission.