Davis v. Posson

Background

Glenn Davis, identified as a state prisoner, filed a civil action in Monterey County Superior Court against several defendants, including Dr. S. Posson and Dr. M. Sweet at the Correctional Training Facility, where Davis was confined. Posson and Sweet removed the action to federal court and requested screening under the federal prisoner-screening statute. Davis also moved for appointment of counsel.

Davis alleged that he had a medical history including Valley Fever and mobility impairment and considered himself “totally disabled, high risk.” He claimed that the facility failed to protect him when he contracted COVID-19 in January 2021 by housing inmates who tested positive with inmates who had not been tested and with inmates who had severe respiratory problems in the infirmary’s outpatient unit. He sought damages and identified four causes of action: professional negligence and medical malpractice, statutory negligence under California Government Code section 845.6, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and “general negligence—deliberate indifference.”

Federal Claims

The court explained that most of Davis’s claims arose under state law. The defendants had removed the case based on references to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Eighth Amendment. The court concluded that the complaint did not state sufficient facts for either federal claim.

For the disability claim, the court explained that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act protects a qualified person with a disability from exclusion from, or denial of the benefits of, a public entity’s services, programs, or activities because of the disability. Even assuming Davis had a qualifying disability, the complaint did not allege that he was excluded from or denied the benefits of a prison service, program, or activity.

For the Eighth Amendment claim, the court treated only the fourth cause of action as potentially raising a constitutional claim because Davis alleged deliberate indifference as well as negligence. The court stated that negligence, including gross negligence, is not enough for a claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. An Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim requires an objectively serious deprivation and a prison official’s deliberate indifference—knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm and failure to take reasonable steps to reduce that risk.

The court found Davis’s allegations insufficient. Although he alleged that he submitted a health-care grievance to Posson and Sweet about infected inmates being housed with other inmates, he did not allege that either defendant actually knew he was a high-risk patient and failed to take reasonable steps to protect him. The court said that conduct showing the defendants should have known of the risk might establish negligence, but not deliberate indifference.

Disposition of the Complaint

The court ordered that the complaint be dismissed with leave to amend. Davis was given 28 days from the filing of the order to file an amended complaint using the court’s form and to correct the identified deficiencies. The court stated that an amended complaint would replace the original complaint, and claims or defendants omitted from it would no longer be part of the case.

Alternatively, Davis could notify the court within the same period that he wished to strike the Americans with Disabilities Act and Eighth Amendment claims and have the case remanded to state superior court for adjudication of the remaining state-law claims. The court stated that failing to respond as ordered would result in dismissal of the ADA and Eighth Amendment claims for failure to state a claim, after which the remaining state claims would be remanded to state court.

Motion for Appointment of Counsel

The court denied Davis’s motion for appointment of counsel. It explained that a civil litigant generally has no constitutional right to appointed counsel unless losing the case could result in loss of physical liberty. Appointment under the federal statute governing assistance to indigent litigants is discretionary and reserved for exceptional circumstances. The court concluded that Davis’s scheduled neck surgery and other operations, with their expected recovery time, did not amount to exceptional circumstances. The denial was without prejudice to the court appointing counsel later if circumstances warranted it.

Judge’s Ruling

Judge Beth Labson Freeman dismissed the complaint with leave to amend and denied the motion for appointment of counsel. The order did not resolve the remaining state-law claims on their merits; it provided for possible remand of those claims to state court.