Day v. GEICO Casualty Company
- Beth Freeman
- 5:21-cv-02103
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 5
In Day v. GEICO, Judge Freeman granted GEICO’s motion to strike Jessica Day’s jury demand because her remaining unfair-competition claim carries no Seventh Amendment jury right.
Jessica Day, the certified class, and GEICO Casualty Company, GEICO General Insurance Company, and GEICO Indemnity Company. The order removes the jury demand for the remaining California Unfair Competition Law claim.
What happened
Day v. GEICO concerns GEICO’s pandemic premium-credit program. Jessica Day, representing a class, alleges that GEICO violated California’s unfair-competition law by providing inadequate refunds and making misleading statements about the program.
GEICO asked the court to strike Day’s request for a jury trial. GEICO argued that California unfair-competition claims do not carry a federal constitutional right to a jury. Day opposed the motion and argued that the restitution she seeks can be legal rather than equitable relief.
Judge Freeman granted GEICO’s motion to strike. The court concluded that Day’s remaining claim was not sufficiently like an eighteenth-century common-law action and that the remedies sought—such as restitution, disgorgement, or a constructive trust—were not shown to be legal in nature.
The detailed version
- Day v. GEICO Casualty Company · No. 5:21-cv-02103
- Beth Freeman
- Feb. 27, 2023
Background
The lawsuit concerns the “GEICO Giveback,” a program announced during the COVID-19 pandemic. The program gave new and renewing customers a 15% credit on personal auto-insurance premiums for specified policy periods. Jessica Day alleges that reduced driving and fewer accidents reduced GEICO’s paid claims and increased its profits, but that GEICO failed to provide additional refunds. She also alleges that GEICO limited the credit to renewing customers, falsely claimed that the program provided “substantial and full relief,” and failed to disclose its alleged excessive profits.
After earlier orders on GEICO’s motions to dismiss, Day had one remaining claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law, or UCL. The court had certified a class of California residents who purchased personal automobile, motorcycle, or recreational-vehicle insurance from GEICO covering any portion of the period beginning March 1, 2020.
Motion and legal standard
GEICO moved to strike Day’s jury demand, arguing that the remaining UCL claim does not carry a right to a jury trial. Day opposed the motion.
The court applied the federal Seventh Amendment analysis for statutory claims. It considered both the nature of the statutory action—whether it resembles an eighteenth-century common-law action—and the nature of the remedy sought—whether the relief is legal or equitable. The court explained that the remedy inquiry is more important.
Analysis
For the first inquiry, the court agreed with the reasoning of other courts that the UCL parallels section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act and does not necessarily parallel a common-law claim for unfair competition. The court therefore found that this factor weighed against a Seventh Amendment jury right.
For the remedy inquiry, the court noted that the UCL permits injunctive relief and restitution. Although Day argued that restitution is not always equitable, the court must examine the substance of the requested remedy rather than its label. Day sought disgorgement, restitution, and a constructive trust over GEICO’s alleged unjust enrichment, but she did not explain why the restitution sought in this case should be treated as legal relief. The court therefore found that this factor also weighed against a jury right.
Disposition
The court determined that Day had no Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial on her UCL claim in this case. It ordered that GEICO’s motion to strike the jury demand was GRANTED.
Read the full 5-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.