Marshall v. Kijakazi

Background

Carrie A. Marshall sought review of a partially favorable Social Security decision by Administrative Law Judge David LaBarre. The decision divided her claim into three periods:

- For the First Period, from January 6, 2014, through June 25, 2015, the administrative law judge found that Marshall was not disabled. - For the Second Period, from June 26, 2015, through February 20, 2020, he found that she was disabled. - For the Third Period, beginning February 21, 2020, he found that her disability had ended because of medical improvement.

The administrative law judge found that Marshall would be absent at least two days per month during the Second Period, which made her unable to perform work existing in significant numbers. For the Third Period, he found that she would miss only one workday per month and could perform jobs identified by a vocational expert.

This was the second time the case reached the district court. In March 2020, Judge Orrick had granted Marshall’s summary-judgment motion and remanded the case for further proceedings because the administrative law judge had improperly evaluated evidence concerning Marshall’s stress tolerance, medical opinions, symptoms, and lay-witness testimony. After the second administrative decision, the Commissioner agreed that the administrative law judge again made significant errors regarding the First and Third Periods.

Parties’ positions

The Commissioner moved for another remand so the administrative law judge could reassess Marshall’s testimony and medical evidence, determine her residual functional capacity—the work she could still perform despite her impairments—and obtain additional vocational-expert testimony.

Marshall argued that the court should instead apply the Ninth Circuit’s “credit-as-true” rule. Under that rule, improperly rejected evidence is treated as true when the record is complete, the reasons for rejecting the evidence were legally insufficient, and accepting the evidence would require a disability finding. Marshall sought a remand solely for calculating and paying benefits for the First and Third Periods.

The Commissioner acknowledged that the administrative law judge had not given legally sufficient reasons for rejecting Marshall’s testimony, medical opinions, and vocational evidence. The Commissioner nevertheless argued that unresolved issues and ambiguities required another administrative proceeding.

Court’s analysis

Judge Orrick concluded that all three credit-as-true requirements were satisfied. First, he found that the record was fully developed and that further proceedings would serve no useful purpose. The vocational expert had clearly testified that missing more than one day of work per month would prevent sustained employment, so additional vocational testimony was unnecessary.

Second, the Commissioner’s admissions established that the administrative law judge had failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting relevant evidence. Third, medical opinions from Nurse Practitioner Mole and Dr. Japra stated that Marshall’s limitations would cause her to miss more than four days of work per month. The court found that those limitations existed at least as far back as the relevant earlier period. Crediting the evidence as true therefore required a finding that Marshall was disabled during the disputed periods.

The court also noted additional limitations identified by Dr. Japra, including a need to elevate Marshall’s legs during the workday and cardiac symptoms that would interfere with attention and concentration. The court said these limitations further supported an award of benefits. Although Judge Orrick had declined to order benefits during the earlier appeal, he found that the passage of more than seven years since Marshall’s application and the burden of further delay were exceptional circumstances supporting immediate payment.

Ruling and effect

Judge Orrick granted the Commissioner’s motion to remand under the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). He remanded the case with a finding of disability for calculation and payment of benefits, covering the undisputed Second Period and the disputed First and Third Periods. The order did not send the case back for another fact-finding hearing.