Jones v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation

Background

Amanda Jones was traveling from Santa Cruz to San Jose on Highway 17 Express Bus No. 2310. The bus was operated by the Santa Cruz Metropolitan Transit District under contract with Amtrak. Jones was using a motorized scooter while recovering from knee surgery. The scooter, with Jones seated on it, fell during the trip, causing Jones to fall to the floor.

Jones’s Third Amended Complaint asserted claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, and negligence. After summary judgment proceedings and an appeal, the only remaining claim was negligence against Amtrak and the transit district. The case went to trial on March 13, 2023. The court denied Amtrak’s initial motion for judgment as a matter of law without prejudice. After eight days of trial, the twelve-person jury could not reach a verdict, and the court declared a mistrial.

Rule 50 Standard

Amtrak then filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50. The court could grant the motion only if no reasonable juror could find for Jones, viewing the trial evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to her. The court explained that a jury’s inability to reach a verdict does not necessarily prevent judgment as a matter of law.

Evidence Not Admitted at Trial

Jones’s opposition relied on a contract between Amtrak and the transit district, a consent judgment, and Amtrak’s website. The court found that none of this material had been admitted at trial and therefore could not be used to decide the motion. The court sustained Amtrak’s evidentiary objections.

Direct Negligence

Under California law, negligence requires a legal duty of care, a breach of that duty, and a causal connection between the breach and the injury. Jones presented evidence that the bus driver may have driven too fast, failed to secure the scooter properly, failed to offer Jones a seat belt, and failed to warn about the risks of sitting on a scooter on a moving bus. There was also testimony concerning the driver’s training on scooter securement.

The court held that the trial evidence did not show that Amtrak had a relevant duty concerning the driver’s conduct or training. The driver testified that he worked for the transit district, and there was no evidence that he was an Amtrak employee. Testimony that the route was an Amtrak service and that there was some contract between Amtrak and the transit district was too limited to allow a jury to find that Amtrak was responsible for the driver’s conduct. The court also found that Jones had not presented facts showing that Amtrak had a duty concerning that conduct.

Agency-Based Negligence

The court separately considered whether Amtrak could be held responsible because the transit district or the bus driver was allegedly Amtrak’s agent. An agency relationship can be actual, meaning the principal has the right to control the agent, or ostensible, meaning the principal’s conduct causes a third person reasonably to believe that another person is authorized to act for the principal.

The court first held that the Third Amended Complaint did not adequately notify Amtrak that Jones was pursuing an agency theory. The complaint alleged generally that the defendants acted through employees and agents and alleged that the bus was operated by the transit district and Amtrak. The court found those allegations insufficient to put Amtrak on notice that the transit district was alleged to be Amtrak’s actual or ostensible agent. Jones could not introduce a new theory of liability for the first time at trial.

The court also held that the trial evidence was insufficient even if the agency theory had been adequately pleaded. Although witnesses testified that there was some agreement between Amtrak and the transit district concerning operation of the bus, the agreement’s contents were not admitted into evidence. There was little evidence of Amtrak’s involvement and no evidence that Amtrak had the right to control the transit district’s management of the bus or its employees. The court therefore found insufficient evidence of actual agency.

As to ostensible agency, the court acknowledged evidence that Jones believed Amtrak was involved in operating the bus and that many Highway 17 buses displayed the Amtrak name. But there was no evidence showing that Jones relied on an understanding that Amtrak was responsible for operating the bus or that such reliance caused her injury. The court concluded that the trial evidence could not support an ostensible-agency relationship.

Disposition

The court granted Amtrak’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. The opinion does not state a separate disposition of Jones’s negligence claim against the transit district.