Garrick v. Garrick

Background

Owen Garrick sued Jocelyn Freeman Garrick in her individual and official capacities, along with the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office, Alameda County Emergency Medical Services, the Alameda County Public Health Department, and Mentoring in Science and Medicine. The opinion states that Owen Garrick and Jocelyn Freeman Garrick are physicians in Alameda County, are married but separated, and have ongoing divorce proceedings.

Garrick alleged that Freeman Garrick used her power, authority, and contacts to harass him and gain an advantage in the divorce proceedings. He identified allegations involving a report to the Alameda County Sheriff’s Department, service of a denied restraining order, and Freeman Garrick’s report of Dr. Valorie Spivey Herd to the California Board of Psychology. Garrick alleged federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and state claims under California’s Bane Act, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and Unfair Competition Law.

Anti-SLAPP motions

An anti-SLAPP motion is a request to strike claims arising from protected speech or petitioning activity. The court held that the main basis of each state-law claim was conduct connected to litigation and other protected activity. It concluded that communications with the Sheriff’s Department, service of restraining-order papers, and the report to the California Board of Psychology fell within protected activity under California law.

The court then considered whether Garrick showed a probability of succeeding on the state-law claims. For the Bane Act claim, the court found that the complaint did not adequately allege an egregious interference with constitutional rights through deliberate or spiteful threats, intimidation, or coercion. For the emotional-distress claim, the court found insufficient facts showing extreme or outrageous conduct or intentional or reckless causation of severe distress. For the Unfair Competition Law claim, the court found that most of the alleged conduct was not a business practice, that some conduct was legally privileged, and that the alleged kickback scheme was conclusory and did not show Garrick suffered the required economic injury.

The court therefore granted defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions as to Garrick’s state-law claims and denied them as to his federal claims. Because defendants prevailed on the state-law claims, they may seek attorney’s fees and costs associated with the successful anti-SLAPP motions. The court stated that work performed on the federal claims is not compensable under that request.

Motions to dismiss

The court addressed the motions to dismiss only as to the remaining federal claims. For the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court explained that the challenged conduct must fairly be treated as government action. Although Freeman Garrick held official positions within the County, the complaint did not plausibly allege that she acted in an official capacity. The court characterized her communications with the Sheriff’s Department, participation in her own divorce proceedings, and report of Dr. Herd as private conduct. It therefore granted the motions as to the § 1983 claims.

Garrick also asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(2) and 1985(3), which address certain civil-rights conspiracies. The court held that Garrick had not alleged an agreement or meeting of the minds among defendants to violate his constitutional rights. It also found that the first clause of § 1985(2) did not apply because Garrick had not alleged that defendants deterred his participation in a federal-court proceeding. His claims under the second clause of § 1985(2) and under § 1985(3) also failed because he had not alleged discriminatory class-based or race-based intent. The court granted the motions as to the federal claims and denied the motions as moot as to the state-law claims.

Disposition

Judge Tigar concluded that defendants’ motions were granted in part and denied in part. The court dismissed all claims with leave to amend because it could not conclusively determine that additional facts could not cure the identified deficiencies. Garrick could file an amended complaint limited to attempting to cure those deficiencies within 21 days of the order. The order states that failure to file a timely amended complaint would result in dismissal with prejudice.