Milton v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation CTF- Soledad

Background

Six plaintiffs who were not present during the July 20, 2020 operation at Correctional Training Facility Soledad alleged that they contracted COVID-19 because of the operation. The plaintiffs were William Pardue, on behalf of himself and the estate of his son Raemon Pardue; Robert Clark; Adam Sanford; Saul Pelayo; William Milton; and Vickter Estrada. The complaint asserted thirteen causes of action, including claims under federal civil-rights statutes, the Eighth Amendment, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, the California Ralph Act and Bane Act, and state-law theories of battery, negligence, and negligent supervision.

The defendants moved to dismiss. On a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court tests whether the complaint states a legally recognized claim supported by enough factual allegations to make liability plausible. The court generally accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true at this stage.

Rulings

The court granted in part and denied in part the motion.

Administrative exhaustion. The court dismissed all claims brought by Vickter Estrada, Saul Pelayo, and Adam Sanford with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Their grievance forms did not adequately describe the alleged connection between their infections and the July 2020 operation. The court held that this deficiency could not be cured by amendment.

Causation and surviving plaintiff. The court dismissed all claims brought by William Milton and Robert Clark because the complaint did not plausibly allege that the July 2020 operation, rather than another possible source, caused their infections. The court granted leave to amend those claims. By contrast, the allegations that Raemon Pardue contracted COVID-19 within ten days of the operation and may have contracted it from a cellmate who was removed from his cell during the operation were sufficient at the pleading stage. The court therefore allowed claims brought by William Pardue on behalf of Raemon Pardue’s estate to proceed in part.

Criminal-statute claims. The court dismissed with prejudice the claims under 18 U.S.C. § 175, the federal Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act, and the California Prevention of Terrorism Act because those criminal statutes do not create a private civil cause of action.

Racketeering claims. The court dismissed with prejudice the civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claims and the conspiracy claim. It held that the complaint did not adequately allege a continuing pattern of racketeering activity arising from the one-time July 2020 operation or a concrete injury to business or property. The court also noted that the related claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 lacked sufficient factual allegations of a conspiracy, although the claim had already been dismissed because of the lack of a private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 175.

Ralph Act and Bane Act. The court dismissed the California Ralph Act claim with leave to amend because the plaintiffs acknowledged that they were not personally subjected to violence during the operation. It also dismissed the Bane Act claim with leave to amend because the complaint did not allege that the COVID-19 plaintiffs, who were not present during the operation, were threatened, intimidated, or coerced by a defendant.

State-law claims. The court dismissed the battery claim with leave to amend because none of the plaintiffs in this action alleged that a defendant touched them. It dismissed the negligent-supervision claim with leave to amend because the complaint’s allegations that supervisors were unfit or incompetent were conclusory and did not allege prior knowledge of an actor’s alleged misconduct. The negligence claim was dismissed with leave to amend to the extent it was based on the use of force, because the plaintiffs did not allege that force was used against them. The negligence claim could proceed as to William Pardue on behalf of Raemon Pardue’s estate to the extent it was based on failing to use safety protections, social-distancing protocols, or measures to minimize the spread of infectious diseases.

The court also dismissed William Pardue’s individual-capacity claims with leave to amend because the complaint did not state a wrongful-death claim or other claim based on injuries he personally suffered. The court refused to substitute Lawrence Brown as a plaintiff because Brown was already an Incident Plaintiff in a concurrent related case.

Disposition

The court’s surviving claims were: an Eighth Amendment claim concerning infliction of disease under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; a racial-discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d); and the limited state-law negligence claim concerning safety protections, social distancing, and preventing infectious-disease spread. The plaintiffs could file an amended complaint within 28 days, limited to addressing the deficiencies identified in the order. Judge Tigar ordered that failure to file on time would result in dismissal of the relevant claims with prejudice.