Samaniego v. County of Contra Costa
- Jon Tigar
- 4:23-cv-02594
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 10
In Samaniego v. County of Contra Costa, Judge Tigar denied plaintiffs’ request to stop property abatement because they had not shown likely legal success.
The plaintiffs’ request to stop the County’s property abatement was denied. The County defendants could proceed without the requested preliminary relief, and the order expressly left the merits of claims against the property-owner defendants undecided.
What happened
Samaniego v. County of Contra Costa concerns people living in trailers, recreational vehicles, and boats on property the County had declared a public nuisance. The plaintiffs asked the court to stop the County’s planned removal of those items, at least until relocation assistance was provided.
The court said plaintiffs had not first sought the required California court review of the County Board of Supervisors’ abatement decision. It also said plaintiffs had not shown that their separate request for a court order requiring relocation benefits was likely to succeed, because the property was not zoned for habitation and the County’s authority to advance benefits was discretionary.
Judge Tigar denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The order did not express an opinion about the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims against the property-owner defendants.
The detailed version
- Samaniego v. County of Contra Costa · No. 4:23-cv-02594
- Jon Tigar
- June 29, 2023
Background
The case arose from a dispute over property commonly known as 1970 Taylor Road in Bethel Island, Contra Costa County. The property is owned by BI Properties, Inc., which the opinion says is owned by Alan Wagner and Kevin Davidson. Plaintiffs lived on the property in trailers, recreational vehicles, and boats.
The property is in a retail-business zoning district that does not allow people to live in recreational vehicles or trailers unless they are in an authorized recreational-vehicle park or campground. County code-enforcement officers had investigated the property since 2005 and identified conditions the opinion describes as unsafe and unsanitary, including inadequate sanitation, no running water, inadequate heating, faulty electrical wiring, and no sewage or garbage services.
The County declared the property a public nuisance in June 2021 and served the owner with a notice and order to abate it. The owner appealed but later withdrew the appeal, and the order became final. In April 2023, the County again declared the conditions a public nuisance. Two people living on the property appealed, and the County Board of Supervisors held a hearing on May 9, 2023, then affirmed the abatement officer’s determination. The County later contracted with a private vendor to remove the trailers, recreational vehicles, boats, unpermitted electrical system, and various items described as junk, garbage, and debris.
Plaintiffs sued County defendants and property-owner defendants, seeking injunctive and monetary relief. Their claims included a civil-rights conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, negligence, a California writ-of-mandate claim, and a California taxpayer action. They moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to stop the abatement, at least until relocation assistance was provided under California Health and Safety Code § 17975.
Legal standard
The court applied the four-factor test for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. A plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on the merits, likely irreparable harm without relief, that the balance of equities favors an injunction, and that an injunction serves the public interest. The court explained that failure to make the required showing concerning likely success or serious questions on the merits can prevent relief without consideration of the other factors.
Court’s analysis
The County defendants argued that plaintiffs were required to exhaust judicial remedies by filing a petition under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5 before challenging the Board’s abatement decision. Plaintiffs argued that they were challenging how the abatement would be carried out rather than the abatement itself, that the order was directed to the property owners, and that a § 1094.5 petition would not protect their homes during review.
The court concluded that challenging the abatement was central to several of plaintiffs’ claims, including their claims involving civil-rights conspiracy, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Fourth Amendment, and the taxpayer action. It also concluded that the Board’s proceedings met the required fairness conditions: the Board acted in a judicial capacity, resolved disputed factual and legal issues, and allowed represented appellants to present evidence and argument. The court therefore held that plaintiffs had to file a § 1094.5 petition before bringing those claims and that, because they had not done so, the court was barred from hearing them. The court did not reach the County’s alternative argument based on the Younger doctrine.
The remaining claim considered in the injunction analysis was plaintiffs’ request for a writ of mandate under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1085. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that state-law claim, citing its lack of jurisdiction over the federal claims and the early stage of the litigation. The court also concluded that plaintiffs had not shown likely success on the claim. It reasoned that California Health and Safety Code § 17975 provides relocation benefits to people displaced from residential rental units, while plaintiffs had not shown that the property consisted of residential rental units and the property was not zoned for human habitation. The court further explained that any decision by a local enforcement agency to advance relocation payments was discretionary and that plaintiffs had not alleged an abuse of discretion.
The court acknowledged that many plaintiffs made a strong showing on the equitable considerations, including long-term occupancy, difficulty finding alternative housing, and insufficient money to pay for suitable housing. But because plaintiffs had not shown likely success or serious questions going to the merits, the court did not analyze the other injunction factors.
Disposition
The court denied plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The order stated that it expressed no opinion regarding the merits of plaintiffs’ claims against the property-owner defendants.
Read the full 10-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.