Brown v. APL Maritime Ltd.

Background

Quentin M. Brown alleged that he worked as a seaman and wiper aboard the M/V President Wilson beginning November 21, 2021. He alleged that Yasin Berber subjected him to repeated sexual advances, touching, harassment, and, on December 2, 2021, forcibly inserted a finger into his anal area without consent. Brown also alleged that supervisors witnessed or knew about Berber’s conduct, failed to investigate or take corrective action after Brown complained, and that Brown experienced retaliation and was constructively discharged.

Brown asserted five claims against APL: negligence under the Jones Act, unseaworthiness, sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. He asserted claims against Berber for sexual assault, sexual battery, sexual harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. APL moved to dismiss all of Brown’s claims. Berber moved to dismiss the two emotional-distress claims and sought to strike or obtain a clearer statement of the sexual-misconduct claim.

APL’s Motion to Dismiss

The court denied dismissal of the Jones Act negligence claim. APL challenged whether it had notice of a dangerous condition. The court held that Brown adequately alleged that supervisors witnessed Berber’s repeated harassment and unwelcome advances before the alleged assault, which was enough at the pleading stage to allege that APL or its agents knew or should have known of the danger and failed to prevent a foreseeable assault.

The court also denied dismissal of the unseaworthiness claim. Unseaworthiness concerns whether a vessel and its crew were reasonably fit for their intended use. The court held that, accepting Brown’s allegations as true, the alleged rape was different from cases involving less severe sexual harassment and could support a finding that Berber’s conduct did not fall within the usual standards of the work and reflected a dangerously vicious disposition.

The court granted dismissal of Brown’s Title VII sex-discrimination claim. Brown did not adequately allege that he experienced a materially harmful employment action or was actually treated differently from similarly situated people outside his protected class. The court also found that the complaint did not adequately support constructive discharge because it did not allege that Brown resigned. The claim was dismissed with leave to amend.

The court denied dismissal of Brown’s Title VII retaliation claim. The court explained that retaliation claims use a broader standard for harmful employment actions than discrimination claims. Brown alleged that, after he complained about sexual harassment and assault, he faced retaliation and verbal attacks, was told he did not fit the ship’s dynamics, and was required to obtain a psychological evaluation to make the next voyage. The court held that these allegations were sufficient at the pleading stage.

The court denied without prejudice APL’s motion to dismiss Brown’s intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. The parties agreed that federal maritime law applied. The court held that APL had not adequately shown, under maritime agency principles, why APL could not potentially be responsible for Berber’s conduct. APL could raise that challenge later at the summary-judgment stage, when the court would have a fuller legal and factual record.

The court also denied without prejudice APL’s motion to dismiss Brown’s negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. The court stated that maritime law applied and that the applicable standard was the “zone of danger” test, which concerns emotional harm resulting from physical impact or an immediate risk of physical harm. The court found that APL had not analyzed Brown’s claim under the applicable standard.

Berber’s Motions

Brown agreed to voluntarily dismiss his negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim against Berber, and the court dismissed that claim. The court allowed Brown’s intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim against Berber to proceed at the pleading stage, holding that the alleged sexual harassment and sexual battery were sufficient, if true, to state a claim involving extreme and outrageous conduct.

The court granted Berber’s motion for a more definite statement. Brown’s third claim appeared to combine separate claims for sexual assault, sexual battery, and sexual harassment. The court directed that, if Brown filed a second amended complaint, he must number each tort claim separately rather than combine them in one claim. Because the court granted the request for a clearer statement, it denied the motion to strike as moot.

Disposition

The court stated that APL’s motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. Brown’s Title VII sex-discrimination claim was dismissed with leave to amend. Berber’s motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part, and Brown’s negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim against Berber was dismissed. Berber’s motion for a more definite statement was granted, and his motion to strike was denied as moot. Brown was ordered to file a second amended complaint within 14 days.