Doe 1 v. National Collegiate Athletic Association
- Laurel Beeler
- 3:22-cv-01559
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 30
In John Doe 1 v. University of San Francisco, Judge Beeler granted motions to dismiss some claims, allowed others, and denied motions to strike.
The order affected the fourteen John Doe plaintiffs, the University of San Francisco, and coaches Anthony N. (aka Nino) Giarratano and Troy Nakamura. The claims of Does 4–14 were narrowed by the statute-of-limitations ruling, while some claims by Does 1–3 and two discrimination claims by Does 4–14 remained pending.
What happened
John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and other former University of San Francisco baseball players sued the university and two coaches. They alleged that the coaches created a sexualized and abusive team environment and punished players who did not participate. The plaintiffs brought claims under Title IX, California education laws, negligence theories, and contract law, and sought damages and policy changes.
The court dismissed most claims by John Does 4–14 as too old to pursue, but allowed their Title IX discrimination and California Education Code section 66270 discrimination claims to continue. It allowed John Does 1–3 to continue their retaliation and inadequate-policy-notice claims. It dismissed the contract claims and request for policy changes, allowing amendment, and dismissed the NCAA-related contract theory because the players did not plausibly show they were intended beneficiaries. The court refused to strike allegations concerning abuse in the Catholic Church.
Judge Laurel Beeler issued the order on August 2, 2023. The plaintiffs may file an amended complaint within 28 days, following the court’s instructions about comparing it with the current complaint.
The detailed version
- Doe 1 v. National Collegiate Athletic Association · No. 3:22-cv-01559
- Laurel Beeler
- Aug. 4, 2023
Background
The fourteen plaintiffs were former University of San Francisco Division I baseball players. John Does 1–3 played more recently, and John Does 4–14 played during earlier seasons. They sued individually and on behalf of a proposed class of USF baseball-team members since 2000.
The plaintiffs alleged that head coach Anthony Giarratano and assistant coach Troy Nakamura created a sexualized and abusive team culture over many years. The alleged conduct included nudity, sexual comments and gestures, sex toys, vulgar names, sexualized hazing, and punishment of players who did not participate or approve. The alleged punishments included insults, benching, reduced playing time, interference with playing opportunities, and other mistreatment. The plaintiffs alleged psychological harm and said USF failed to respond adequately to complaints and concealed the broader pattern of conduct.
The complaint asserted seventeen claims, including sex discrimination under Title IX and California Education Code section 66270, Title IX retaliation, inadequate notice of USF’s sexual-harassment policies under California Education Code section 66281.5, negligence-based claims, emotional-distress claims, ratification, breach of contract, and interference claims. The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient and plausible claim. USF also moved under Rule 12(f) to strike allegations concerning abuse involving the Catholic Archdiocese and challenged the request for injunctive relief based on standing. The plaintiffs conceded dismissal of claims 16 and 17, which were asserted against the coaches.
Statute of Limitations
The court held that the statute of limitations did not bar Does 4–14’s Title IX discrimination claim or their California Education Code section 66270 discrimination claim at the pleading stage. Those claims were based on an alleged institutional failure by USF to address the coaches’ conduct, and the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that USF concealed a broader pattern of deliberate indifference. The court held that whether the discovery rule delayed the start of the limitations period was better addressed on a fuller factual record at summary judgment.
The court held that the statute of limitations did bar the remaining claims by Does 4–14. Those claims included the claims against the coaches and related negligence, emotional-distress, retaliation, inadequate-notice, and other claims identified by the court. The court reasoned that the alleged conduct was overt and that the plaintiffs experienced it as abuse when it occurred. It also concluded that the contract claims had no discernible basis for delayed accrual.
Title IX Retaliation
The court denied the motion to dismiss Does 1–3’s Title IX retaliation claim. A retaliation claim requires protected activity, an adverse action, and a connection between them. The plaintiffs alleged that they opposed or refused to participate in the sexualized conduct and were punished or pushed off the team for doing so. The court found those allegations sufficient at the pleading stage, even though the connection between the complaints and USF’s actions was not especially strong.
The court noted that the retaliation claims of Does 4–14 remained barred by the statute of limitations.
California Education Code Section 66281.5
The court denied the motion to dismiss Does 1–3’s claim that USF failed to provide required notice of its sexual-harassment policies and reporting procedures. The court agreed that the statute generally requires exhaustion of an administrative complaint before a person may seek civil remedies. But the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that USF did not tell them about the policies or how to report harassment. Because the factual dispute was better addressed at summary judgment, the claim survived the motion to dismiss.
Contract Claims
The court dismissed claims 13 and 14, based on alleged written and oral contracts between the players and USF, with leave to amend. The complaint attached the wrong contract, and the plaintiffs relied in their opposition on additional documents and theories that were outside the complaint and could not be considered at this stage.
The court also rejected the claim that the players were third-party beneficiaries of a contract between the NCAA and USF. A third-party beneficiary is someone whom the contracting parties intended to benefit directly. The court held that the NCAA provisions cited by the plaintiffs described general principles for member athletic programs but did not show an intent to create direct contractual obligations to the players. The conclusion states that the contract claims for Does 1–3 were dismissed with leave to amend.
Motions to Strike
The court denied the motion to strike allegations about abuse involving the Catholic Church and the San Francisco Archdiocese. Some allegations could possibly bear on USF’s alleged policies and response to abuse, and the court could not say at the pleading stage that they had no possible relevance. The court recognized that the allegations might raise concerns about confusion or prejudice at trial, but it left those issues for a later stage.
Request for Injunctive Relief
The plaintiffs sought an order requiring USF to adopt, implement, and enforce policies addressing sexual misconduct and psychological abuse. The court treated the issue as one of standing and mootness. Because Doe 1 had transferred away from USF after the complaint was filed, the court held on the existing record that his request for injunctive relief was moot. The court dismissed the request without prejudice to an amended complaint and briefing addressing the changed circumstances.
Disposition
Judge Laurel Beeler granted the motions to dismiss the claims of John Does 4–14 as barred by the statute of limitations, except for their Title IX and California Education Code section 66270 discrimination claims. For Does 1–3, the court dismissed the contract claims and the request for injunctive relief with leave to amend. The court denied the motion to dismiss Does 1–3’s retaliation and section 66281.5 claims. The court denied the motions to strike allegations related to abuse in the Catholic Church. Any amended complaint had to be filed within 28 days and include a blackline comparison with the current complaint.
Read the full 30-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.