Calderon v. Covello

Background

Juan Carlos Calderon, a state prisoner, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his state conviction and sentence. A California jury convicted him in 1993 of second-degree murder of his month-old son and two counts of felony child endangerment. He received a sentence of 21 years to life in state prison. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction in 1994.

The federal court had previously found that the petition stated two claims that could be considered in federal habeas proceedings. Patrick Covello, the respondent, moved to dismiss all four claims for failure to state a federal claim, lack of federal habeas jurisdiction, failure to exhaust, inadequate pleading, and untimeliness. The court did not reach the exhaustion, pleading, or timeliness arguments because it dismissed the petition on other grounds.

The court also stated that it would not consider additional papers Calderon filed without obtaining the approval required by the local rules.

Claims and analysis

Claim one: Senate Bill 1437 resentencing. Calderon argued that he was entitled to resentencing under California Senate Bill 1437 and California Penal Code § 1170.95. The court held that this claim concerned the interpretation and application of California sentencing law and therefore did not state a federal claim that could support habeas relief. Merely describing the state-law issue as a due-process or equal-protection violation was not enough. The court also relied on the state appellate court’s finding that Calderon had been convicted as the actual killer, not under a felony-murder theory. Claim one was dismissed for failure to state a cognizable federal claim.

Claim two: Youth-offender parole relief. Calderon challenged the denial of relief under Senate Bill 260, later expanded by Senate Bill 261. The court noted that Senate Bill 260 applied to people who were under 18 when they committed the offense, while the opinion stated that Calderon was older than 18 and that the respondent said he was 19. The court held that this claim was primarily based on alleged errors in applying state law and did not state a cognizable federal claim. It also held that it lacked federal habeas jurisdiction because success would at most lead to a youth-offender parole hearing, not necessarily immediate or earlier release. Claim two was denied for failure to state a cognizable claim and for lack of federal habeas jurisdiction.

Claim three: Transfer to Mexico. Calderon claimed that the parole board improperly denied his request to be transferred to Mexico. The court explained that the foreign prisoner transfer treaty makes transfer discretionary and does not give prisoners a right to transfer. It also noted that Calderon did not argue that a transfer would shorten his sentence. The court therefore held that the claim did not establish a federal-right violation and did not fall within federal habeas jurisdiction. Claim three was denied for failure to state a cognizable federal claim and for lack of federal habeas jurisdiction.

Claim four: Parole denial. Calderon alleged that the parole board used policies and confidential information to keep him imprisoned and violated several constitutional amendments. The court explained that federal due-process protections in this parole setting require an opportunity to be heard and a statement of the reasons for denial. It found no allegation that Calderon lacked those basic procedures during his multiple parole hearings. The court also stated that challenges to California’s parole procedures generally belong in state court and that success on Calderon’s claim would not necessarily result in speedier release. Claim four was denied for failure to state a cognizable federal claim and for lack of federal habeas jurisdiction.

Disposition

The court granted Covello’s motion to dismiss. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied with prejudice for failure to state a cognizable claim and for lack of federal habeas jurisdiction. Calderon’s motions concerning exhaustion, equitable tolling, and other relief were denied as moot. The court denied a certificate of appealability because Calderon had not shown that reasonable judges could debate whether the petition stated a valid constitutional claim or whether the court’s procedural ruling was correct. Judge Beth Labson Freeman ordered the case and the specified motions terminated.