Cline v. Calpine Corporation

Background

George Cline alleged that he was employed by Gifford’s Backhoe, Inc., which subcontracted to perform work with Calpine Operating Services Company, Inc. and/or Geyser Power Company, LLC. In November 2020, Cline was driving uphill on a privately owned gravel road toward a drilling rig site on property controlled by defendants. The road was too narrow for two vehicles to pass safely. Cline alleged that Dennis Miller, a Calpine employee driving a Geyser-owned truck, traveled downhill at a high rate of speed and collided with Cline’s stopped vehicle.

Cline alleged that the accident injured his neck, back, and wrist, and that he later underwent neck surgery. He also alleged that, after the accident, a contracted supervisor, Keith Powers, required Cline and a passenger to sign an accident report that incorrectly attributed fault to Cline and threatened them with job loss if they refused. Cline further alleged that his employer, Gifford’s, told him he would lose his job if he filed a workers’ compensation claim and later told him he would not have a job to return to after medical treatment.

The Second Amended Complaint asserted five claims. The first was a negligence claim against Calpine based on Miller’s conduct. The second was labeled “negligence per se.” The third and fourth claims alleged retaliation under California Labor Code sections 1102.5 and 6310. The fifth alleged that defendants violated California Labor Code section 6400 by failing to provide a safe workplace. Calpine and Geyser moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss some claims for failure to state a claim and alternatively moved under Rule 12(b)(7) for failure to join Gifford’s as a required party.

Legal standard

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests whether the complaint’s factual allegations plausibly state a legal claim. The court generally accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true and views them favorably to the nonmoving party. A Rule 12(b)(7) motion addresses whether a person whose absence could prevent complete relief, impair protection of an interest, or create inconsistent obligations must be joined under Rule 19.

Court’s analysis

The motion did not challenge the first negligence claim at the pleading stage. As to the second claim, the court agreed that negligence per se is an evidentiary presumption that may apply in some circumstances, rather than an independent claim for relief. Nevertheless, the court denied the motion as to that claim, with the understanding that it was not an independent claim and was effectively redundant of the negligence claim. Defendants could explore through discovery the basis for Cline’s contention that the presumption applies.

The court held that Cline adequately alleged protected activity for purposes of the third and fourth claims by alleging that he reported the accident to a job-site supervisor. But the court found that Cline did not adequately allege an adverse employment action by Calpine or Geyser connected to that report. Cline alleged that Powers threatened him with job loss if he did not sign the accident report, but he signed it and continued working for approximately two weeks. The complaint stated that he stopped working because of his physical injuries, not because defendants fired him, changed his working conditions, or otherwise retaliated against him for reporting unsafe conduct.

The court understood the alleged job loss to have resulted from retaliation by Cline’s own employer for filing a workers’ compensation claim, rather than retaliation by Calpine or Geyser for reporting unsafe or unlawful driving. The court therefore granted the motion as to the third and fourth claims.

The court also granted the motion as to the fifth claim. Cline relied on employees’ rights to report unsafe workplace conditions without retaliation, but the court explained that those allegations concerned the third and fourth retaliation claims, which did not survive. The court stated that Cline retained an unchallenged common-law negligence claim concerning the unsafe conduct that allegedly caused the accident and his injuries, but held that California Labor Code section 6400 did not support the fifth claim as pleaded.

The court rejected defendants’ alternative argument that Gifford’s was necessarily an indispensable party to the claims against Calpine and Geyser. Instead, the court distinguished between Cline’s personal-injury claims arising from the accident and the potential job-loss claim against Gifford’s. The court stated that Cline could potentially pursue both types of claims in one action with Gifford’s, Calpine, and Geyser as defendants, but that such an action would have to be filed in state court because there was no diversity jurisdiction for an action between Cline and Gifford’s. Alternatively, Cline could pursue the accident-related claim against Calpine, and possibly Geyser, in this court.

Disposition

The court denied the motion to dismiss as to the second claim for relief and granted the motion as to the third, fourth, and fifth claims for relief. The court allowed Cline 15 days from the date of the order to file an amended complaint if he in good faith believed he could allege different or additional facts supporting retaliation claims against Calpine or Geyser. If he chose not to amend, or chose to dismiss and pursue the matter in state court, he was directed to file the required statement or dismissal within 15 days.