Conner v. Raver

Background

Rochelle Conner worked for the City of Emeryville as an Executive Assistant to the City Manager and City Attorney from November 2015 through January 2022. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the city required employees to certify that they had no COVID-19 symptoms or known exposure. In October 2021, the city adopted a policy requiring employees either to receive a COVID-19 vaccine or undergo weekly testing.

Conner requested a religious accommodation. She proposed daily certification, masking, distancing, limits on interactions, relocation to a vacant workspace, or remote work. The city offered non-invasive saliva testing instead of nasal-swab testing and asked questions about the religious basis and scope of her objection. The city stated that remote work was not acceptable because Conner’s duties required in-person support, front-desk coverage, mail processing, filing, administrative-record preparation, logistical support for in-person meetings, and emergency work at a city facility.

The city ultimately directed Conner to comply with the policy and later terminated her employment for failing to do so. Conner obtained a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and sued the City of Emeryville, Trish Raver, and Lori Elefant. She alleged violations of California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, slander, the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the California Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause under § 1983. The opinion states that Conner was representing herself.

Ruling

Judge Tigar granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed the complaint under the rule governing whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court dismissed all claims against Elefant because the complaint contained no allegations against her and Conner conceded that dismissal was appropriate.

The court dismissed the Fair Employment and Housing Act claim because Conner had not alleged that she obtained the required right-to-sue notice from California’s Department of Fair Employment and Housing. It dismissed the slander claim because Conner had not alleged that she presented the claim to the city as required by California’s Government Claims Act. The court concluded that the Government Claims Act did not apply to Conner’s federal claims or require compliance for her Fair Employment and Housing Act claim.

The court dismissed the California constitutional claim seeking damages because it found no authority recognizing a separate damages claim for violating Article I, Section 4 of the California Constitution. It dismissed that claim with prejudice because amendment would be futile.

The court dismissed Conner’s Title VII claims against Raver because individual defendants cannot be held liable for damages under Title VII. It also dismissed Conner’s § 1983 claims against Raver because Raver was named only in her official capacity and the city was also named; an official-capacity claim against a municipal officer is equivalent to a claim against the municipality.

Title VII Claims Against the City

The court treated Conner’s Title VII allegations as asserting three theories: failure to accommodate her religious beliefs, retaliation for seeking an accommodation, and disparate impact from the policy.

For failure to accommodate, the court held that the complaint and attached documents showed that remote work would have caused substantial increased costs in relation to the city’s business because Conner’s duties required in-person work. The court also found that the city considered other options, including saliva testing, other vacant positions, and unpaid leave. It therefore dismissed the claim.

For retaliation, the court found that the attached documents contradicted Conner’s assertion that she was fired for seeking an accommodation. The city considered her request for more than three months, corresponded with her, gave her additional time to comply, and stated that it terminated her for noncompliance with the policy. The court dismissed the retaliation claim.

For disparate impact, the court held that the complaint and attached documents showed the policy was consistent with business necessity because Conner’s job required in-person work and weekly testing was intended to protect workplace health and safety. The court dismissed the disparate-impact claim.

Section 1983 Claims Against the City

The court dismissed the Free Exercise claim because the policy was neutral and generally applicable: it did not refer to religious practices and applied to all employees regardless of the source of their objection. The court applied rational-basis review and found that promoting a safe and healthy workplace during the pandemic was a legitimate governmental purpose.

The court dismissed the Equal Protection claim because Conner did not allege facts supporting an inference that the city acted with discriminatory intent based on religion. She also did not allege that similarly situated employees received the requested accommodation or avoided termination for failing to comply. The court found that the complaint and attached documents instead gave the alternative explanations that the policy was adopted for workplace safety, remote work was incompatible with her duties, and she was terminated for noncompliance.

Disposition

The defendants’ motion was granted, and the complaint was dismissed. The California constitutional claim was dismissed with prejudice. The remaining claims were dismissed with leave to amend because the defendants had not shown that amendment would be prejudicial, undertaken in bad faith, unduly delayed, or futile. Conner could file an amended complaint within 21 days, limited to attempting to cure the deficiencies identified by the court. The order stated that failing to file a timely amended complaint would result in dismissal with prejudice.