Jones v. County of Marin

Background

Cameron Jones alleged that he was discriminated against and ultimately terminated from the Marin County District Attorney’s Office. He alleged that he received more work than his white female colleagues, received a negative performance evaluation, complained to the Marin County Human Resources Department about racial and gender discrimination, and was fired on the day he was interviewed as part of the County’s investigation into his complaint.

The defendants—the County of Marin, the Marin County District Attorney’s Office, Lori Frugoli, Rosemary Slote, Tom McCallister, and Shari Goldman—moved to dismiss all 19 claims. Jones consented to dismissal of claims four, six, seven, ten through sixteen, eighteen, and nineteen.

Court’s analysis

The court applied the standard for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which asks whether the complaint states a legally recognized claim supported by enough factual allegations to make relief plausible. The court generally accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion, but not conclusory assertions or unreasonable inferences.

Section 1983 claims

Section 1983 provides a claim against a person acting under state law who violates rights protected by the Constitution or federal statutes. The court considered Jones’s claims based on First Amendment retaliation and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection.

For the First Amendment retaliation claim, the court held that Jones adequately alleged a claim against Frugoli and Slote. Jones alleged protected speech, an adverse employment action—his termination—and facts supporting an inference that his complaint was a substantial or motivating factor in the termination. In particular, Jones alleged that Slote knew about his grievance because Slote declined to participate in arbitration on behalf of the District Attorney’s Office, and that Jones was fired shortly afterward.

The court granted the motion to dismiss the First Amendment retaliation claim against Goldman and McCallister, with leave to amend, because Jones did not connect their alleged conduct to his termination. The court dismissed that claim against the County and the District Attorney’s Office, without leave to amend, because it was duplicative of Jones’s separate local-government liability claim for First Amendment retaliation. The court denied the motion as to the claim against Frugoli and Slote.

The court held that Jones adequately alleged Fourteenth Amendment equal protection violations. It found that his allegations—that he was a Black man, was qualified for his position, received more work, and was singled out for a negative performance evaluation compared with white female colleagues—were sufficient at the motion-to-dismiss stage. The court also found that these allegations supported his fifth and ninth local-government liability claims against the County and District Attorney’s Office under the theory that the alleged conduct was carried out by a final policymaker.

The court dismissed Jones’s eighth local-government liability claim, which was based on a policy, practice, or custom, with leave to amend. Jones did not identify the relevant policy or provide allegations about other people’s treatment that could support an inference of a widespread practice or established custom.

Conspiracy claims

The court construed Jones’s first claim as a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), which addresses conspiracies to deprive people of constitutional rights. The court dismissed the claim with leave to amend because Jones alleged that the defendants had agreed to deprive him of his rights but did not provide specific facts supporting the existence of an agreement.

Jones’s second claim arose under 42 U.S.C. § 1986, which concerns failing to prevent a § 1985 conspiracy. Because the court found that Jones had not stated a § 1985 claim, it also dismissed the § 1986 claim with leave to amend.

California Labor Code claim

The court denied the motion to dismiss Jones’s seventeenth claim under California Labor Code section 1102.5. That provision protects an employee from retaliation for disclosing information about a suspected violation of state or federal law to someone authorized to investigate or correct it. The court found that Jones adequately alleged protected activity, termination, and a causal connection because Slote allegedly knew about his grievance and Jones was fired on the day of his investigative interview.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss claims four, six, seven, ten through sixteen, eighteen, and nineteen, consistent with Jones’s consent, without leave to amend. It granted the motion to dismiss claims one, two, and eight, with leave to amend. It granted the motion to dismiss claim three against Goldman and McCallister, with leave to amend, and against the County and District Attorney’s Office, without leave to amend. It denied the motion to dismiss claim three against Frugoli and Slote and claims five, nine, and seventeen.

Jones could file an amended complaint within 21 days, solely to correct the deficiencies identified in the order. The order states that if no amended complaint was filed by that date, the claims dismissed in the order would be dismissed with prejudice. The court also denied the defendants’ request for judicial notice of Marin County personnel regulations and administrative policies because it found those documents unnecessary to resolve the motion.