A.H. v. West Contra Costa Unified School District

Background

A.H., who was a minor when the complaint was filed, alleged that her teacher, Jane Shetterly, sexually abused her while A.H. was a student at De Anza High School within the District. A.H. alleged that she had disabilities including anxiety, depression, and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and that she qualified for an Individualized Education Program. She alleged that Shetterly took her on overnight trips, engaged in sexual acts with her, and exchanged pornographic images with her.

A.H. also alleged that Summer Sigler, the school’s principal, observed circumstances indicating a relationship between A.H. and Shetterly, including inappropriate physical touching. According to the allegations, Sigler did not report the conduct or take corrective action. A.H. further alleged that the District did not formally reprimand Shetterly or follow up after learning that Shetterly taught remotely from A.H.’s home, and that Shetterly continued to abuse A.H.

Defendants Sigler and the District moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not allege enough facts to support a legally plausible claim. They sought dismissal of seven causes of action. They did not seek dismissal of A.H.’s second, fifth, or seventh causes of action against them, or of her third cause of action against Shetterly. They conceded that new allegations were sufficient to plead the actual-knowledge requirement for A.H.’s Title IX claim, so that claim was not part of the motion.

Sexual-Harassment Claim Against the District

A.H.’s fourth cause of action alleged sexual harassment under California Civil Code section 51.9. The court held that, under the reasoning of a California Court of Appeal decision, a public school district is not a “person” that can be sued under section 51.9. The court granted the District’s motion as to this claim and dismissed the fourth cause of action against the District with prejudice. The claim could proceed against other individual defendants.

Disability-Discrimination Claims

A.H.’s eighth and ninth causes of action alleged discrimination under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The court said A.H. needed to plausibly allege that the discrimination occurred because of, or solely because of, her disabilities.

The court found that the second amended complaint did not add factual allegations addressing the deficiency identified in an earlier order. It found conclusory A.H.’s allegations that she was selected and groomed because of her disabilities, that Shetterly used her authority and A.H.’s disabilities to assault her, and that the District denied her an alternative placement despite knowing about her fear and anxiety. The court granted the motion and dismissed the eighth and ninth causes of action with leave to amend.

A.H.’s eleventh cause of action, under California Government Code section 11135, was described as derivative of her Americans with Disabilities Act claim. Because the court dismissed the Americans with Disabilities Act claim with leave to amend, it granted the motion and dismissed the eleventh cause of action with leave to amend.

Mandatory-Duty Claims

A.H.’s first and sixth causes of action sought liability under California Government Code section 815.6 for breach of a mandatory duty. That statute requires an underlying enactment to impose a mandatory duty on a public entity, protect against the type of injury at issue, and have been breached in a way that proximately caused the injury.

The court concluded that the statutes and regulations A.H. identified—including education and school-safety provisions, school-supervision regulations, constitutional provisions, and the California Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act—did not plausibly establish a mandatory duty imposed on the District. The court also rejected A.H.’s argument that duties imposed on employees could be attributed to the District. It granted the District’s motion as to the first and sixth causes of action and dismissed those claims against the District with leave to amend.

As to Sigler, the court held that section 815.6 authorizes liability against public entities, not individuals. It further stated that, even if A.H. intended to assert a claim directly under the child-abuse reporting statute, that criminal statute does not create a private right of action. The court dismissed the sixth cause of action against Sigler under section 815.6 or the reporting statute with prejudice. The court noted that a vicarious-liability theory in the first cause of action was not challenged and could proceed.

Bane Act Claim

A.H.’s tenth cause of action alleged that the District violated California Civil Code section 52.1, known as the Bane Act. The court explained that the claim required allegations of interference with legal rights through threats, intimidation, or coercion, along with the specific intent to violate civil rights.

The court found sufficient A.H.’s allegations that Sigler, acting within the scope of her employment, had direct knowledge of the abuse and failed to take remedial action after observing inappropriate touching and hearing A.H. describe Shetterly as her girlfriend. The court treated the claim as based on Sigler’s alleged deliberate indifference, rather than on vicarious liability for Shetterly’s abuse. It denied the motion to dismiss as to the Bane Act claim.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion to dismiss. It gave A.H. 30 days from the date of the order to amend the first, sixth, eighth, ninth, and eleventh causes of action. The order disposed of docket entry 42. Judge Araceli Martinez-Olguin signed the order.