Court, Explained
U.S. Federal District Courts
Back to docket
D. Minn.Procedural orderFiled July 26, 2021

Judah v. Ovsak

Judge
Eric Tostrud
Docket
0:21-cv-00618
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
36
Civil RightsMotion to DismissCivil ProcedureADA / Disability
In one sentence

In Judah v. Ovsak, Judge Tostrud partly granted and partly denied defendants’ motion to dismiss claims by a civilly committed MSOP patient.

Who this affects

Willim Judah’s case continues in part. The order dismissed some claims against the Minnesota Department of Human Services’ officials, dismissed the specified medical-malpractice claims with prejudice, and left the remaining challenged claims and defendants unaffected by the dismissal.

What happened

Willim Judah, who is civilly committed at the Minnesota Sex Offender Program, sued the Minnesota Department of Human Services and individual state officials. He alleged inadequate medical care, unlawful punishment, retaliation, religious interference, denial of private calls with his attorney, disability discrimination, and negligence.

The court dismissed some claims but allowed others to continue. It dismissed the unconstitutional-custom claim, the access-to-courts claim, and parts of the medical-care, religious-practice, and negligence claims. It allowed the ADA retaliation claim and the remaining challenged claims to proceed, including the negligence claims that were not medical-malpractice claims.

Judge Tostrud granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The dismissals of Counts 1, 4, 5, and 7 were without prejudice, while the medical-malpractice portion of Count 10 was dismissed with prejudice.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Judah v. Ovsak · No. 0:21-cv-00618
Judge
Eric Tostrud
Date
July 26, 2021

Background

Willim Judah, who is civilly committed at the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP), sued the Minnesota Department of Human Services and thirty-nine individual state officials. His Second Amended Complaint asserted ten counts involving alleged inadequate medical care and safety conditions, punishment during civil confinement, retaliation for complaints and an earlier lawsuit, interference with religious practice, interference with legal communications, inadequate training and supervision, unconstitutional customs or practices, disability discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and negligence.

The defendants moved to dismiss nine of the ten counts under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint plausibly states a legal claim. They did not seek dismissal of Count 8, the ADA disability-discrimination claim.

Court’s analysis

The court rejected the defendants’ argument that Counts 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, and 10 violated the rule requiring a short and plain statement of the claim. Although the complaint could have been clearer, the factual allegations identified the individual defendants’ roles and conduct well enough to provide fair notice.

The court allowed Count 9, Judah’s ADA retaliation and coercion claim, to proceed against the individual defendants in their individual capacities. The court held that the ADA provision prohibiting retaliation by a “person” authorizes individual liability in the public-services context, and the defendants did not otherwise challenge the sufficiency of that claim.

The court dismissed Count 7, Judah’s claim concerning an unconstitutional custom or practice. The court concluded that Judah had not plausibly alleged that an individual supervisory defendant helped create, apply, or interpret the challenged restraint, keyboard, or treatment-related policies in a way that violated the Constitution. The court also determined that the alleged keyboard restriction was a minor property limitation that did not plausibly amount to unconstitutional punishment.

As to Count 1, the deliberate-indifference claim concerning medical needs, the court dismissed the claim against Jensina Rosen, Susan Johnson, and Terrance Kneisel because the allegations did not plausibly show that they knew of and deliberately disregarded excessive risks to Judah’s health. The claim against David Rose was adequately pleaded because Judah alleged that Rose personally saw his serious surgical wounds and heard his complaints but continued ordering him to move rooms and floors. The order did not dismiss Count 1 as to the other defendants challenged in the motion.

The court dismissed Count 4, the religious free-exercise claim, against Susan Johnson, Samuel Clark, Sara Kulas, and Ann Marie Linkert-Korhonen. Judah did not connect their alleged conduct involving a keyboard, legal calls, a medical pillow, or mail to his religious practice. The court did not dismiss the claim against the other defendants named in Count 4.

The court dismissed Count 5, concerning access to counsel and the courts. Although Judah alleged that a staff member overheard a legal call and that defendants denied his requests for private legal calls, he did not allege that the conduct prevented him from contacting his attorney by other means or stopped him from pursuing a nonfrivolous legal claim. The court therefore found no adequately alleged actual injury or prejudice under the applicable standard.

The court partly dismissed Count 10, the negligence claim. It dismissed with prejudice the portion seeking recovery for medical malpractice against Keri A. Ovsak, David Paulson, John Barry, Laurel Sturlaugson, Michelle Breamer, Brittany K. Crock, Heather Blaschko, John Gemlo, Sharon Autio, Krista Lynn Gilpin, Nicole Boder, Deborah K. Barron, Nicole W. Hawkins, Julie Rose, Jennifer Jones, Breanna Guthmiller, Gary Ankarlo, Elizabeth Peterson, Kimberly Ann Storm, and Andrew Bustos. Judah had not provided the expert-review affidavit required by Minnesota law after the defendants’ litigation papers gave adequate notice of that requirement and more than sixty days had passed.

The court allowed other negligence theories to proceed. It concluded that the allegations against Scott Sutton, Susan Johnson, and Michael Hettig could involve administrative conduct or conduct not connected to the exercise of medical judgment. It also noted that negligence claims against the listed health-care professionals could proceed to the extent they concerned conduct not involving medical judgment, such as Julie Rose’s alleged role in forcing Judah to move rooms. The court rejected the defendants’ limitations argument at this stage because the complaint did not establish that the federal claims were untimely.

Disposition

Judge Eric C. Tostrud ordered that the motion to dismiss be granted in part and denied in part. The motion was granted as to Count 7, which was dismissed without prejudice; granted as to Count 1 against Jensina Rosen, Susan Johnson, and Terrance Kneisel, with that portion dismissed without prejudice; granted as to Count 4 against Susan Johnson, Samuel Clark, Sara Kulas, and Ann Marie Linkert-Korhonen, with that portion dismissed without prejudice; and granted as to Count 5, which was dismissed without prejudice. The motion was granted in part as to Count 10, with the medical-malpractice portion against the specified defendants dismissed with prejudice. The motion was denied in all other respects.

The authoritative version

Read the full 36-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
Summary written with AI assistance. See how summaries are made. Spot something wrong? Tell us.