Diaz v. Starbucks Corporation

Background

Andrea Diaz and her minor son, M.A., are California citizens. They originally sued Starbucks Corporation, Mariko Doe, and other unnamed defendants in Alameda County Superior Court, asserting one negligence claim. They alleged that a hot beverage purchased at a Starbucks location in San Leandro spilled on them on May 2, 2020, because the lid was not securely attached to the cup.

Starbucks, which the opinion states is headquartered in Washington, removed the case to federal court under the diversity-jurisdiction statute. The plaintiffs initially believed that Mariko Doe, later identified as Mariko Brown, was the supervisor or manager of the San Leandro location. Through discovery, plaintiffs’ counsel learned about Sabrina Hopken. The plaintiffs had already dismissed Mariko Brown and sought permission to amend the complaint to add Hopken as a defendant.

The plaintiffs also sought remand, meaning a return of the case to state court, if Hopken were added. They argued that Hopken was a California citizen and that adding her would eliminate the complete diversity required for federal diversity jurisdiction.

Legal standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e), when a plaintiff seeks to add a defendant after removal and the addition would eliminate subject-matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder or permit joinder and remand the action. The court considered six factors: whether the new defendant was needed for a fair resolution, whether the statute of limitations would bar a separate state-court action, whether the request was timely, whether the plaintiffs sought joinder mainly to defeat diversity jurisdiction, whether the claim appeared valid, and whether denying joinder would prejudice the plaintiffs.

Court’s analysis

The court found that Hopken was not needed for a fair resolution. The parties had stipulated that Hopken acted within the scope of her employment with Starbucks in connection with the incident. Under the employer-liability rule discussed by the court, Starbucks could be held responsible for torts committed by its employee within the scope of employment. Because Starbucks agreed to be responsible for Hopken’s alleged actions, joining Hopken was unnecessary for the plaintiffs to obtain complete relief.

The statute-of-limitations factor was neutral because neither side meaningfully addressed it. The court found no undue delay: the plaintiffs said they learned about Hopken through discovery responses served on June 24, 2023, and filed the motion on August 8, 2023. The court found that the plaintiffs’ motive weighed only slightly against amendment because the parties offered competing accounts of whether the purpose was to add a potentially responsible party or to return the case to state court.

The court said the negligence claim against Hopken appeared valid on its face because she allegedly was the supervisor or manager of the premises. But the plaintiffs’ agreement that Hopken acted within the scope of her employment weakened the claim against her individually. The court therefore treated the validity factor as weighing against joinder. Although denying joinder would prejudice the plaintiffs by denying their choice of forum, the plaintiffs could still obtain information and evidence from Hopken through discovery as a witness.

Disposition

After weighing the factors, the court concluded that joinder of Hopken was not warranted. Chief Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu denied the plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint and denied their motion to remand the action to Alameda County Superior Court.