Loomer v. Meta Platforms, Inc

Background

Laura Loomer and Laura Loomer for Congress, Inc. sued Mark Zuckerberg, Meta Platforms, Inc., X Corp. (formerly Twitter), Jack Dorsey, The Procter & Gamble Company, and unnamed government officials. The complaint alleged that the defendants formed a racketeering enterprise that unlawfully censored conservative voices and interfered with elections. The asserted civil claims were under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, or RICO: one claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), involving participation in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, and one claim under § 1962(d), involving conspiracy to violate § 1962(c).

The alleged predicate acts included interference with commerce by threats or violence, interstate transportation in aid of racketeering, wire fraud, providing material support to terrorists, and advocating overthrow of the government. Loomer alleged that Facebook and Twitter banned or restricted her and her political campaign, and that Procter & Gamble pressured Facebook to ban her by threatening to withdraw advertising. She also alleged coordination between Twitter and federal government officials concerning content moderation and elections.

Motions and Legal Standards

The Twitter and Facebook defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not plausibly state a legal claim. They argued that claim preclusion, also called res judicata, barred the claims and that § 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act protected their conduct. All defendants argued that the RICO claims were not plausibly pleaded. Loomer also moved for leave to file a proposed second amended complaint.

Claim Preclusion

The court held that claim preclusion barred the claims against the Twitter and Facebook defendants, including Mark Zuckerberg and Jack Dorsey. The doctrine prevents a party from relitigating claims that were or could have been raised in an earlier lawsuit involving the same parties or their legal equivalents, after a final judgment on the merits.

The court found that earlier cases had produced final judgments on the merits and that the relevant parties were legally connected to the parties in this case. As to Facebook, the court reasoned that Loomer could have brought her RICO theory in her earlier defamation case because the Facebook ban, her candidacy, and the alleged pressure from Procter & Gamble had already occurred when that complaint was filed. As to Twitter, the court found that the earlier case had already challenged a concerted effort to suppress conservative content and that Twitter’s conduct toward Loomer formed part of a single course of conduct that could not be divided into separate lawsuits.

The court rejected Loomer’s argument that later allegations about federal officials, the Hunter Biden laptop story, Alex Berenson’s ban, and her firearm restriction created new claims against Twitter and Facebook. The court said those allegations were unrelated to Twitter’s conduct toward Loomer and did not change the claim-preclusion analysis.

Communications Decency Act

As an alternative ground, the court held that § 230(c)(1) also barred the claims against Twitter, Facebook, Zuckerberg, and Dorsey to the extent the claims were based on the platforms’ conduct. Section 230 generally protects interactive computer services from liability for decisions to publish, remove, or restrict content supplied by others, unless the service materially created or developed the unlawful information.

The court concluded that Loomer’s RICO theory depended on treating Twitter and Facebook as publishers because it challenged their decisions to ban accounts, remove or restrict content, display warnings, and allow or disallow material on their platforms. The court also rejected the argument that the platforms became information-content providers by using fact-checkers, filtering content, collecting user data, or arranging content. The complaint did not plausibly allege that those activities materially contributed to unlawful content, and the dispute concerned removal of Loomer’s accounts rather than creation of unlawful content.

RICO Claims Against Procter & Gamble

The court separately held that the complaint did not plausibly allege that Procter & Gamble was part of a RICO enterprise. A civil RICO claim requires allegations of conduct by an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity that causes injury to the plaintiff’s business or property. An associated-in-fact enterprise must have a common purpose, an organization or structure, and enough continuity to accomplish its purpose.

Even accepting favorable inferences for Loomer, the court found that the allegations showed Facebook and Procter & Gamble pursuing their own business interests. Procter & Gamble did not want its advertisements placed near content it considered hateful, denigrating, or discriminatory, while Facebook had its own community-standards policies and discussed policy matters with advertisers. The court characterized those actions as lawful business decisions rather than participation in a racketeering enterprise.

The court also emphasized that RICO predicate acts must be crimes, not merely torts or other wrongful conduct. It said that threatening to ban Loomer or label her a dangerous individual, as alleged, described legally acceptable business dealings rather than economic extortion.

Proposed Amendment and Disposition

The court concluded that the proposed second amended complaint would not change the results. Its additional allegations concerned Twitter’s alleged coordination with federal officials, Procter & Gamble’s alleged demand that Facebook ban Loomer, injuries from social-media bans, and wire fraud. The court found that these allegations did not alter its conclusions that claim preclusion applied to the Facebook and Twitter claims, § 230 barred claims based on the platforms’ publishing decisions, and the allegations against Procter & Gamble described lawful business decisions rather than a RICO enterprise.

Judge Laurel Beeler granted the motions to dismiss with prejudice. The court concluded that amendment would be futile, dismissed the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice, and resolved ECF Nos. 79, 80, 81, and 114.