Mickle v. Brown

Background

Denny Mickle filed briefing on claims Q and R of his federal petition challenging his California conviction and death sentence. The Group III claims concerned alleged constitutional violations arising from Mickle’s alleged incompetence to stand trial. The opinion addressed only claims Q and R; it stated that the remaining Group III, Subgroup Two claims would be addressed in a later order.

Mickle was convicted in San Mateo County Superior Court of first-degree murder and arson. The jury also found true a special circumstance involving the murder of a 12-year-old child during a lewd and lascivious act. After the guilt phase, defense counsel requested a competency hearing. A jury later found Mickle competent to stand trial before the penalty phase.

The court applied the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which limits federal relief when a state court has already decided a claim. Under that law, relief is available only if the state court’s decision was contrary to clearly established federal law, unreasonably applied that law, or rested on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The federal court also presumed that the state court’s factual findings were correct.

Claim Q: Psychiatric Assistance

Mickle alleged that he was denied his right to reasonably competent psychiatric assistance. He did not submit additional briefing on this claim, relying instead on arguments similar to those made for a previously denied claim involving psychiatric testimony.

The court agreed with the respondent that Mickle had not identified a legally supportable basis for claim Q. The court explained that the constitutional right to psychiatric assistance does not permit a federal habeas court to test the competence of psychiatric assistance by conducting a later review of the substance of the experts’ opinions. Because Mickle’s challenge to the competence of his psychiatric experts was unsupported by authority, the court denied claim Q.

Claim R: Competence to Stand Trial

Mickle alleged that he was tried while incompetent. He argued that defense counsel should have investigated his competence during the guilt phase and that the 1985 competency hearing before the penalty phase was inadequate. He asserted both a procedural due-process claim—that the trial court should have held a competency hearing on its own—and a substantive due-process claim—that he was actually incompetent when tried.

For the procedural claim, the court explained that a trial court must order an evaluation or competency hearing when it has a good-faith doubt about the defendant’s competence. The relevant question is whether there was substantial evidence that Mickle could not rationally understand the proceedings or consult with his lawyer. The federal court could consider only the evidence before the state trial judge when deciding whether a hearing should have been held.

The court found that Mickle’s earlier hospitalization and mental illness in 1983 did not establish that he could not understand the proceedings or assist his defense in 1984. When Mickle fell asleep during trial, the trial judge ordered an evaluation, and the evaluating psychiatrist attributed the drowsiness to medication and found Mickle’s thinking lucid and intact. The court also found that Mickle’s confusion about a commissioner presiding over the competency hearing concerned the technical arrangement, not necessarily his ability to understand the proceedings. His choice to wear jail clothing and remain shackled likewise did not require a competency hearing because the trial court questioned him and found that he understood his choice.

For the substantive claim, the court considered expert declarations and other evidence offered to show that Mickle was actually incompetent during the guilt and penalty phases. It gave substantial weight to contemporaneous evidence indicating competence, including a defense expert’s finding of no significant impairment before the guilt phase, jail medical records noting the absence of psychosis shortly before trial, defense counsel’s lack of doubt about Mickle’s competence, and a deputy sheriff’s description of his jail behavior as excellent. The court also noted that two psychiatrists who examined Mickle before the competency hearing testified that he could understand the proceedings and assist counsel, and the competency jury found him competent.

The court treated several later expert opinions as retroactive competency determinations and explained that such opinions are disfavored, particularly when weighed against contemporaneous evidence. It concluded that the California Supreme Court’s rejection of Mickle’s actual-incompetence claim was neither an unreasonable application of federal law nor an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Disposition

The court denied claim Q and denied claim R. It did not resolve the remaining Group III, Subgroup Two claims in this order. Judge Jeffrey S. White ordered that those claims would be addressed in a subsequent order.