D.T. v. Kijakazi
- Susan Van Keulen
- 5:22-cv-07245
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 15
In D.T. v. Kijakazi, Judge Van Keulen partly granted and partly denied both summary-judgment motions, remanding for further proceedings on Listing 12.05 and vocational testimony.
D.T. and the Social Security Administration; the case returns to the agency for further proceedings about Listing 12.05 and time-off-task evidence.
What happened
D.T. v. Kijakazi concerns D.T.’s appeal of the denial of supplemental security income. The administrative law judge found that D.T.’s mental-health and substance-related impairments did not prevent him from working and that jobs existed that he could perform.
The court upheld the administrative law judge’s evaluation of the medical opinions and D.T.’s statements about his symptoms. But it found errors in the failure to address Listing 12.05, which concerns intellectual-disorder requirements, and in the failure to explain the vocational expert’s testimony that being off task for 15% or 25% of the workday would prevent all work.
Judge Susan Van Keulen granted in part and denied in part both parties’ summary-judgment motions and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the agency must address Listing 12.05, the extent of D.T.’s time off task, and the vocational expert’s related testimony.
The detailed version
- D.T. v. Kijakazi · No. 5:22-cv-07245
- Susan Van Keulen
- Oct. 17, 2023
Background
D.T. applied for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The administrative law judge denied the application, finding that D.T. had several severe mental-health and substance-related impairments but retained the ability to perform work at all exertional levels, subject to non-exertional limitations. The administrative law judge also found that jobs existed in significant numbers that D.T. could perform. The Social Security Appeals Council declined further review.
D.T. sought judicial review and argued that the administrative law judge improperly evaluated medical evidence, rejected his statements about the severity of his symptoms, evaluated the listed-impairment requirements, and handled vocational-expert testimony.
Court’s Analysis
The court held that the administrative law judge properly evaluated the opinions of Doctors Dixit, Gross, and Amado. Those opinions concluded that D.T.’s conditions would not significantly impair his ability to work, and the administrative law judge adequately considered their supportability and consistency with the record. The court also upheld the decision to find Doctor Kirsch’s more serious limitations unpersuasive because of internal inconsistencies and conflicts with other evidence.
The court likewise upheld the administrative law judge’s evaluation of D.T.’s statements about his symptoms. The administrative law judge did more than make a boilerplate finding: she discussed medical evidence and D.T.’s reported abilities, including performing simple tasks, maintaining hygiene, preparing simple meals, shopping, and cleaning. The court also found that the administrative law judge was not required to accept D.T.’s failed work attempt as proof of disability by itself.
The court found two reversible errors. First, the administrative law judge did not discuss Listing 12.05, even though D.T. had argued before the agency that his impairments met or medically equaled that listing. Although the administrative law judge’s discussion supported rejection of Listing 12.05’s Paragraph B requirements, she did not address the separate Paragraph A requirements, which could independently support a finding of disability.
Second, the administrative law judge did not explain her treatment of the vocational expert’s testimony about time off task. The expert testified that a person who was off task 25% of the time could not work, and separately testified that 15% off-task time also precluded all work. The administrative law judge did not state whether those hypotheticals applied to D.T., whether she credited that testimony, or why she disregarded it. The court found the error was not harmless because medical and other evidence suggested that D.T. might experience some time off task.
Disposition
The court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART D.T.’s motion for summary judgment and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The court remands the action for further proceedings. On remand, the Commissioner must address whether D.T.’s impairments meet or medically equal Listing 12.05, the extent of any time off task, the vocational expert’s time-off-task testimony, and the reasons for accepting or disregarding that testimony.
Read the full 15-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.