J.M. v. Kijakazi

Background

J.M. appealed the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying his application for Title XVI supplemental security income. The administrative law judge found severe impairments including anxiety, dysthymic disorder, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder. The administrative law judge determined that J.M. could perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, subject to nonexertional limitations. Although J.M. could not perform his past work as a coffee maker, the administrative law judge found that he could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, including sweeper, washer, and furniture cleaner.

The Appeals Council denied review. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, asking the court to decide whether the administrative law judge properly evaluated J.M.’s symptom statements, his father’s testimony, the medical evidence, and the social-interaction limits included in J.M.’s residual functional capacity. Residual functional capacity is the most a person can do in a work setting despite his impairments.

Symptom Statements

The court held that the administrative law judge did not give specific, clear, and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence for discounting J.M.’s statements about the severity of his symptoms. The administrative law judge relied on daily activities, including college attendance, prior music teaching, household activities, driving, shopping, hobbies, and helping his parents. But the court found that the decision incompletely and inaccurately described those activities. The record showed, among other things, that J.M. struggled with schoolwork, worked as a music teacher before the alleged onset date, was fired after interaction problems, performed household activities only to a limited extent, and did not engage in certain hobbies often.

The court also found that the administrative law judge failed to consider that some activities, including gardening and making music, were used as coping skills under a treatment plan for anxiety. The administrative law judge also relied on routine conservative treatment without identifying more aggressive treatment options that were available. Because the administrative law judge relied on the disputed activities in determining J.M.’s residual functional capacity, the error was not harmless.

Lay Witness Testimony

J.M.’s father testified that J.M. had nightmares, slept sporadically, had poor memory and concentration, was reclusive, and did not achieve his goals. The administrative law judge did not mention or evaluate this testimony. The court held that an administrative law judge must consider lay testimony about a claimant’s symptoms and cannot disregard it without comment. The Commissioner’s proposed reasons for discounting the father’s testimony could not substitute for reasons the administrative law judge had not given. The court found the error was not harmless.

Medical Evidence

Under the applicable regulations, the administrative law judge had to evaluate the persuasiveness of medical opinions, expressly addressing supportability and consistency. The court found that the reasons for preferring Dr. G.R. Ibarra’s opinion that J.M. could perform simple and detailed tasks over Dr. S. Khan’s opinion limiting J.M. to simple, one- or two-step work in a non-public setting were insufficient. The administrative law judge relied on J.M.’s intellect, college attendance, lack of an individualized education program in high school, and ability to drive, but did not adequately explain how those facts supported the greater task complexity finding. The error was not harmless because the vocational testimony and the disability decision relied on that distinction.

The court did not find error in the administrative law judge’s evaluation of the opinions of Dr. Tac Nguyen, Dr. Diane Kecskes, and therapist Yao-Szu Tsou. The court found that the administrative law judge gave sufficient reasons for discounting Dr. Nguyen’s opinion, including the absence of concentration problems in nearby examination notes; adequately addressed the support and consistency of Dr. Kecskes’s opinion; and permissibly found that Tsou’s form lacked specific references to treatment notes.

The court also found the explanation for rejecting portions of consultative examiner Patricia Spivey’s opinion inadequate. The administrative law judge characterized some findings as internally inconsistent based on expected symptoms, without medical evidence or other authority supporting that reasoning. The administrative law judge also did not explain how J.M.’s normal IQ and memory results and linear thought process related to his ability to withstand the stress of a normal workday or maintain emotional stability and predictability. The error was prejudicial because the residual functional capacity included frequent interactions, goal-oriented productivity, and the ability to adapt to workplace changes, while the vocational expert testified that being off task 15 percent of the workday or being absent as little as two days per month would eliminate competitive work.

Social-Interaction Limits

The court held that the administrative law judge’s explanation for allowing frequent interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and familiar members of the public, but only occasional interaction with unfamiliar members of the public, was not adequately supported. The administrative law judge relied on facts such as driving, gardening, college attendance, music teaching, hiking, and being described as nice and cooperative in one interview. The court found that some of those facts did not show sustained workplace interaction and that the decision omitted contrary context, including J.M.’s limited and unsuccessful school participation, his pre-onset music teaching and termination after interaction problems, and his infrequent hiking.

Because the administrative law judge also erred in evaluating J.M.’s statements, his father’s testimony, and certain medical evidence, the court required the residual functional capacity to be reconsidered using the relevant evidence.

Disposition

The court GRANTED J.M.’s motion for summary judgment and DENIED the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The court REMANDED the case for further proceedings because the record did not clearly require the administrative law judge to find J.M. disabled after properly evaluating the evidence.