Pinn v. Consumer Credit Counseling Foundation, Inc.

Background

Kelly Pinn brought one putative class claim under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, alleging that the defendants made unsolicited telemarketing calls to telephone numbers registered on the national Do Not Call registry. The defendants included Digital Media Solutions, LLC (DMS); Consumer Credit Counseling Foundation, Inc. (CCCF); National Budget Planners of South Florida, Inc. (NBP); and Ishwinder Judge.

Pinn alleged that CCCF contracted with DMS to obtain potential customers and that DMS contracted with Vedanata Infotech, a telemarketing company in India, to make outgoing calls and supply leads to CCCF. She alleged that she received several unsolicited calls in April 2022. After she answered one, the caller connected her to an adviser who identified herself as being from CCCF and offered debt-consolidation services.

DMS submitted evidence that Pinn’s phone number had a Texas area code and that Pinn was a Texas resident. DMS said Vedanata placed the call, later transferring it to CCCF through DMS’s exchange, and that DMS itself had no role in making the call. DMS also stated that it had no officers, directors, property, business offices, or real estate in California, although it had remote-work employees there.

Motions and jurisdictional standard

DMS moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Personal jurisdiction is a court’s authority over a defendant. Pinn sought additional discovery about DMS’s contacts with California and moved to continue consideration of the motion. The parties also filed a joint discovery letter concerning DMS’s discovery responses.

The court considered only specific personal jurisdiction because Pinn did not argue that DMS was subject to general jurisdiction in California. Specific jurisdiction can exist when a defendant deliberately directs conduct toward the forum, the claim arises from that conduct, and exercising jurisdiction would be reasonable.

Because the claim was based on alleged wrongful telemarketing, the court applied the three-part effects test: an intentional act, expressly aimed at California, that caused harm the defendant knew was likely to occur there.

Court’s reasoning

The court concluded that Pinn had shown several intentional acts by DMS that DMS did not rebut, including contracting with CCCF and playing some role in facilitating the connection between Vedanata and CCCF. The court said it did not need to resolve the parties’ disputes about the extent of DMS’s control over Vedanata or whether DMS itself transferred the call.

The court held, however, that Pinn did not show that DMS expressly aimed its conduct at California. The call at issue was made by Vedanata—not DMS, according to the undisputed point identified by the court—to Pinn in Texas using a Texas phone number. Pinn did not receive the call in California, and Vedanata was not located there. The court reasoned that CCCF’s California location was not relevant because Pinn’s alleged harm—the receipt of an unwanted call—would have been the same regardless of CCCF’s location.

The court also held that DMS’s contractual relationship with CCCF, the possible involvement of DMS’s California-based employee, and the employee’s alleged management or negotiation activities did not establish that DMS expressly aimed the alleged wrongful conduct at California. Because Pinn failed to satisfy the first part of the specific-jurisdiction test, the court granted DMS’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Discovery and disposition

The court denied Pinn’s request for jurisdictional discovery. It concluded that the requested evidence about DMS’s California-based employee and DMS’s relationship with Vedanata would not establish that the call was an intentional act expressly aimed at California.

The court denied Pinn’s motion to continue. It denied the parties’ joint discovery letter without prejudice and directed them to meet and confer, after which they could submit a new, limited joint letter if disputes remained. The opinion’s stated conclusion grants DMS’s motion under Rule 12(b)(2); it does not separately state a disposition of DMS’s Rule 12(b)(6) request.