Dang v. Mayorkas

Background

Qi Dang, a Chinese citizen, applied for asylum in the United States on March 11, 2020. He initially filed the application with the Los Angeles Asylum Office of United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, then moved to the San Francisco Bay Area and reported his new address to the San Francisco Asylum Office. Because the defendants had not scheduled an interview with an asylum officer, Dang sued under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), and the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361. He sought an order requiring the defendants to act on his asylum application.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment is a decision without a trial when there is no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the outcome and one side is entitled to judgment under the law. Dang argued that the delay was unreasonable under the APA. The defendants argued that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, that his Mandamus Act claim was not viable, and that the delay was not unreasonable under the APA.

The record showed that Dang received an employment-authorization document on September 23, 2020, and renewed it in September 2022. He had not requested advance permission to travel and return to the United States, placement on a short-notice interview list, or expedited adjudication based on an urgent humanitarian emergency.

Jurisdiction and Legal Standards

The court held that it had subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The defendants argued that the asylum statute’s statement that its timing provisions do not create an enforceable right meant that the court could not compel an interview. The court treated that argument as going to the merits—whether the defendants had a clear, mandatory duty—not to the court’s jurisdiction.

Under APA § 706(1), a court may compel agency action that the agency has unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. Such a claim requires a discrete agency action that the agency is required to take, along with an unreasonable delay. The court explained that relief under the Mandamus Act and the APA is essentially the same and analyzed the APA claim.

The court recognized that the asylum statute says, absent exceptional circumstances, an initial interview or hearing should begin no later than 45 days after an asylum application is filed. But the statute also says that its provisions do not create a legally enforceable substantive or procedural right against the United States, its agencies, officers, or another person. The court followed decisions concluding that this language forecloses relief under the Mandamus Act but does not prevent review under the APA, which separately requires an agency to act within a reasonable time.

Analysis

The court evaluated whether the delay was unreasonable under the factors commonly called the TRAC factors. Those factors consider: whether the agency follows a reasonable timetable; any timetable or expectation expressed by Congress; the effect on human health and welfare; the agency’s competing priorities; the interests harmed by the delay; and whether the agency acted improperly.

The court found that the factors favored the defendants. First, the asylum office’s “last in first out” scheduling system was a persuasive rule of reason because it schedules recently filed cases ahead of older cases. The court also noted that courts in the district had generally found asylum-application delays of four years or less reasonable under the APA, and sometimes had found delays of more than five years reasonable. The court therefore found that this factor favored the defendants.

Second, Dang did not submit evidence about harm to his health, welfare, or other prejudice from the delay. The court said that some prejudice was inherent in the asylum process and that his authorization to work reduced the impact of the delay. These factors also favored the defendants.

Third, the agency had competing priorities involving other asylum applicants. The court stated that, when a delay has not reached four or five years, courts consider the effect of moving one applicant ahead of others waiting for interviews. This factor supported the defendants as well.

Disposition

The court held that the defendants had not unreasonably delayed acting on Dang’s asylum application. It denied Dang’s motion for summary judgment and granted the defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment. The court stated that it would separately issue a judgment and that the order resolved ECF Nos. 14 and 20.