Estate of Decedent Lolomania Soakai v. City of Oakland

Background

The plaintiffs sued the City of Oakland, Wald Abdelaziz, and Jimmy Marin-Coronel over injuries arising from an alleged police “ghost chase.” The opinion defines a ghost chase as an officer pursuit in which officers do not activate their sirens, lights, or radio because their department prohibits such pursuits due to risks to suspects and bystanders.

The plaintiffs alleged that the individual defendants pursued a suspect from a car rally through crowded Oakland streets at speeds reaching 100 miles per hour, with their lights and sirens off. They alleged that the officers intentionally caused the suspect to crash into cars and motorcycles near a busy taco truck. The crash killed Lolomania Soakai and seriously injured other plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also alleged that the officers saw the resulting injuries, did not stop or call for medical assistance, left the scene, and returned only after hearing other officers respond.

The amended complaint asserted: (1) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the individual defendants for violating Fourteenth Amendment due-process rights; (2) a Section 1983 claim against the City; and (3) a claim under California’s Bane Act against all defendants.

Motions and legal standards

The City moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. Abdelaziz moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), which challenges the legal sufficiency of the claims based on the pleadings. Marin-Coronel joined Abdelaziz’s motion. The court explained that the two motions are evaluated under similar standards and that the allegations are generally accepted as true for purposes of these motions.

Section 1983 claims against the individual defendants

The court held that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged the intent required for a Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim arising from a high-speed police chase. Under the governing standard discussed in the opinion, plaintiffs must allege a purpose to harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest. The court concluded that the allegations that the officers intended to cause the suspect to crash and seriously injure him were sufficient. The court also found that the officers’ alleged departure from the scene supported an inference that the chase lacked a legitimate law-enforcement purpose.

The court rejected the argument that the intent to harm had to be directed specifically at the innocent bystanders. It held that an allegation of an intent to harm anyone unrelated to a legitimate law-enforcement objective can satisfy the required element for a bystander’s Fourteenth Amendment claim.

The court also applied the “danger creation” exception to the general rule that officers ordinarily are not liable under Section 1983 for injuries inflicted by a third party. The exception applies when officials affirmatively create or expose a person to a danger the person otherwise would not have faced. The court found that the plaintiffs alleged the required elements: the officers’ dangerous driving exposed them to a particular danger, injuries from the crash were foreseeable, and the officers were deliberately indifferent to the danger because they allegedly saw the crash and failed to obtain medical assistance.

The court rejected Abdelaziz’s argument that the danger was not sufficiently directed toward the plaintiffs. It concluded that the plaintiffs were a discrete and identifiable group injured by the allegedly intentional crash. The court also rejected Abdelaziz’s qualified-immunity argument at this stage, finding that the alleged facts did not establish that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

Section 1983 claim against the City

The plaintiffs sought to hold the City liable under the municipal-liability rule commonly called Monell. The court explained that a municipality can be liable under Section 1983 when an official policy or established custom causes a constitutional injury.

The plaintiffs alleged that the City’s Police Department adopted a policy in 2014 restricting high-speed pursuits, after which officers developed a widespread practice of using ghost chases to avoid scrutiny. They also alleged that high-ranking supervisors knew about the practice but did not stop it. The court stated that it was debatable whether these allegations sufficiently described a longstanding practice or custom.

The court dismissed the City claim because the plaintiffs did not allege that the City had a policy or practice of officers intending to harm suspects. The court reasoned that the alleged constitutional violation depended on the intent to harm, not merely on conducting a dangerous high-speed chase without lights or sirens. The court granted the City’s motion to dismiss but gave the plaintiffs one opportunity to amend the complaint with additional facts supporting the municipal-liability claim.

Bane Act claim

The court held that the Bane Act requires interference, or attempted interference, with a legal right through threat, intimidation, or coercion, along with specific intent. It found that the plaintiffs had not alleged that the individual defendants coerced them. The court therefore granted the City’s and Abdelaziz’s motions on the Bane Act claim and dismissed the Bane Act claim against all defendants.

The court nevertheless allowed the plaintiffs to amend the Bane Act claim. Abdelaziz argued that California Vehicle Code § 17004 immunized him from the state-law claim, but the court declined to bar amendment because the plaintiffs alleged that the officers intentionally misused their patrol vehicle rather than operating it in the line of duty to pursue a suspect for arrest, and Abdelaziz cited no case applying that immunity to such alleged conduct.

Disposition

The court granted the City’s motion to dismiss. It granted in part and denied in part Abdelaziz’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, and granted Marin-Coronel’s motion to join that motion. The court dismissed the Section 1983 claim against the City and the Bane Act claim against all defendants. It denied the motions as to the Section 1983 claim against the individual defendants. The plaintiffs could file an amended complaint by December 20, 2023, to add facts supporting the Section 1983 claim against the City and the Bane Act claim.