Shahrivar v. City of San Jose

Background

The court stated that the action had a lengthy history before and after an appeal. In an order entered June 21, 2023, the court entered judgment for the remaining defendants on the claims within the scope of the Ninth Circuit’s partial reversal and remand. Farid Shahrivar then filed two motions seeking relief from that judgment. The first invoked Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, and the second invoked Rule 60. The defendants also moved under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for attorney fees incurred after remand, arguing that Shahrivar’s continued litigation was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

Shahrivar’s Rule 59 and Rule 60 motions

Rule 59(e) permits a party to ask the court to alter or amend a judgment within 28 days. The court explained that this remedy is extraordinary and generally requires a manifest legal or factual error, newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence, manifest injustice, or an intervening change in controlling law. It cannot be used to relitigate matters or present arguments or evidence that could have been offered before judgment.

Rule 60(b) permits relief from a final judgment on specified grounds. Shahrivar relied on alleged mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; a void judgment; and other reasons justifying relief. The court noted that relief under Rule 60(b)(6), in particular, requires extraordinary circumstances. Although Shahrivar also cited Rule 60(a), which concerns clerical mistakes or oversights, he offered no argument that such an error existed.

The court found that most of Shahrivar’s Rule 59 motion presented arguments and purported evidence that he said supported the merits of his claims. He did not contend that the material had been unavailable during the summary-judgment proceedings or show that another ground for reconsideration was satisfied. He instead argued that his attorneys had failed to respond to defendants’ requests for admission, failed to seek relief from that failure, and failed to properly oppose the summary-judgment motion in briefing or at oral argument.

The court held that Shahrivar was responsible for his attorneys’ acts and omissions. It found no support in the record for a conclusion that counsel had virtually abandoned him. The court noted that counsel had filed a timely opposition memorandum and appeared for Shahrivar at the hearing. The possibility that different arguments or evidence could have been presented did not justify setting aside the judgment.

The court found that Shahrivar’s Rule 60 arguments, including his challenges to counsel’s performance and his reliance on evidence and arguments supporting the merits of his claims, did not provide a basis for relief. It also rejected his arguments that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection and due-process rights had been violated. According to the court, he had been given due process to present his claims, and losing on the merits was not itself a constitutional violation. The court further found that he had identified nothing amounting to intrinsic or extrinsic fraud that would justify setting aside the judgment.

Shahrivar also argued that a 2020 California appellate decision represented a change in law undermining the Ninth Circuit’s 2018 decision in this case. The court explained that the claims affected by those decisions were part of a 2015 judgment affirmed in 2018 and were not within the scope of the judgment challenged in the current motions. The court therefore denied Shahrivar’s motions to reconsider or set aside the judgment.

Attorney-fee motion

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a prevailing defendant in a Section 1981 suit may recover attorney fees only when the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. The defendants argued that Shahrivar’s claims lacked an evidentiary foundation from the beginning. They also argued that, after the Ninth Circuit limited the case to alleged retaliation under Section 1981 against Tsao, Sykes, and Allen after March 10, 2010, continuing the litigation became objectively unreasonable. They limited their fee request to fees incurred after remand.

The court denied the fee motion. It acknowledged that Shahrivar had not presented sufficient admissible evidence during summary judgment to create a triable issue of fact. But it concluded that the record did not show that his claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation either at the outset or after remand. The court stated that the circumstances did not warrant shifting fees to Shahrivar.

Disposition

The court denied all three motions: Shahrivar’s Rule 59 motion, Shahrivar’s Rule 60 motion, and defendants’ motion for attorney fees.