Ramos v. Nielsen

Background

The plaintiffs are individuals, including some noncitizen adults and some U.S.-citizen children with noncitizen parents, who live legally in the United States. The noncitizen plaintiffs were allowed to remain under Temporary Protected Status (TPS), an immigration program for nationals of countries that cannot safely receive their nationals because of conditions such as armed conflict or environmental disasters. The case concerned TPS designations for Sudan, Haiti, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nepal.

The plaintiffs sued in 2018 and 2019 to challenge the prior administration’s decisions to terminate TPS for those countries. They alleged violations of equal protection, due process, and the Administrative Procedure Act. In 2018, the court issued a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement of some of the terminations. The government appealed, and the Ninth Circuit later granted the plaintiffs’ request for rehearing by the full court. Before that hearing, the government rescinded the terminations for El Salvador, Honduras, Nepal, and Nicaragua and issued new TPS designations for Haiti and Sudan. The Ninth Circuit then granted the government’s request to voluntarily dismiss the appeal.

The plaintiffs also alleged that, when Haiti and Sudan were newly designated for TPS, the Department of Homeland Security required certain prior TPS holders to apply as new applicants and pay a $50 registration fee. The operative amended complaint included claims concerning that fee.

Government’s Motion and Mootness Analysis

The government moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The government argued that the challenges to the TPS terminations were moot because the terminations had been rescinded or replaced by new TPS designations. A case is moot when there is no longer a live dispute or legally recognizable interest in the outcome.

The plaintiffs relied on the voluntary-cessation exception, which can prevent dismissal when a defendant ends challenged conduct but could reasonably be expected to resume it. The court concluded that the government had changed its policy by considering intervening conditions in making TPS decisions, rather than using the narrower approach attributed to the prior administration. The changes were documented in Federal Register notices, addressed the plaintiffs’ objections, had been in effect for at least two years in the case of Haiti, and were followed by repeated TPS designations for Haiti and Sudan.

The court held that the government had met its burden to show that the challenged conduct could not reasonably be expected to recur. It therefore concluded that the plaintiffs’ challenge to the TPS terminations was moot. The court did not need to decide whether a presumption of mootness applied to the government’s TPS determinations because the government prevailed even under the usual standard requiring it to carry a heavy burden.

$50 Registration Fee

The government submitted a declaration stating that USCIS had begun refunding the $50 registration fee to qualifying Haitian and Sudanese TPS beneficiaries who paid it a second time. The declaration stated that USCIS had processed 24,227 Haiti-related refunds and 43 Sudan-related refunds as of August 29, 2023, and that no refunds were then pending.

The court did not decide how the fee-related injury should be characterized. Instead, it relied on the plaintiffs’ agreement that no named plaintiff had paid a $50 registration fee after the new Haiti and Sudan designations. The court concluded that no plaintiff in the case had standing, meaning a sufficient personal connection to the alleged injury, to proceed with that claim. The court allowed the plaintiffs 60 days to file an amended complaint if they wished to pursue a claim based on the registration fee.

Disposition

The court granted the government’s motion to dismiss. It ruled that the claims challenging the TPS terminations were moot and dismissed those claims with prejudice because the plaintiffs had not indicated that they could plead additional facts to overcome the deficiency. The order also stated that the fee-related claim lacked standing and gave the plaintiffs 60 days to amend if they wished to pursue that claim. The order disposed of Docket No. 206.