Ramos v. Nielsen

Background

The plaintiffs challenged the termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haiti, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Sudan. The court denied the government’s earlier motion to dismiss and later granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. In that ruling, the court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their Administrative Procedure Act claim and that there were serious questions concerning their equal-protection claim.

The government appealed. A Ninth Circuit panel reversed the preliminary injunction, but that decision was later vacated when the Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc. The en banc hearing did not occur because the government issued new TPS designations or rescinded the earlier terminations. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal. After the case returned to the district court, the plaintiffs amended their complaint, and the government moved to dismiss. The court granted that motion, concluding that the claims challenging the TPS terminations were moot because the challenged conduct could not reasonably be expected to recur.

The plaintiffs also sought fees for work connected with Bhattarai, a related case involving TPS terminations for Nepal and Honduras. Their motion sought $3,507,052.12 in fees and $147,080.44 in costs initially. They later increased the requested fee amount to $3,684,282.56. The fees covered work by seven public-interest organizations and one law firm, involving more than forty attorneys. For some attorneys, the plaintiffs sought rates above the Equal Access to Justice Act’s statutory rate.

Legal standard and issue

The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, generally permits a prevailing party in a qualifying civil action against the federal government to recover fees and costs unless the government’s position was substantially justified or special circumstances would make an award unjust. The court identified two central requirements: the plaintiffs had to be the prevailing party, and the government’s position had to lack substantial justification.

The court focused on whether the plaintiffs were a prevailing party. The Supreme Court’s February 2025 decision in Lackey held that obtaining a preliminary injunction does not by itself make a plaintiff a prevailing party when the case becomes moot before a final merits judgment. A preliminary injunction may reflect only a likelihood of success and does not conclusively resolve the parties’ legal rights.

The plaintiffs no longer relied solely on the preliminary injunction. They argued that a stipulated order approved by the court made them prevailing parties. That order stayed district-court proceedings during the appeal and provided that TPS would remain in effect for the covered countries for at least a specified wind-down period after the appeal ended.

Court’s analysis

The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument. It held that the stipulated order provided only temporary relief. The order was designed to stay proceedings during the appeal and provide limited protection while the litigation continued; it did not conclusively resolve the plaintiffs’ claims or provide enduring relief. The court also rejected the comparison to a court-approved consent decree because the stipulated order did not finally resolve the claims or materially and permanently change the parties’ legal relationship.

The court further rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that Lackey should not apply retroactively. It reasoned that the Supreme Court applied the rule announced in Lackey to the parties before it, so the rule had to be applied retroactively in other still-open cases presenting the same issue.

Disposition

Judge Edward Chen denied the plaintiffs’ motion for fees and costs under the EAJA. The order disposed of Docket No. 228.