Smith v. City of Marina

Background

Jeremiah Ross Smith brought a civil-rights action concerning events beginning in September 2021 involving the Marina Police Department and several officers and leaders. According to the complaint, Smith reported allegations against the son of a Marina police officer. He alleged that officers later removed him from his home at gunpoint, forced him to the ground, handcuffed and arrested him, pointed guns at his wife and child, and detained them. He acknowledged that the officers had a warrant but alleged that it was improper and unsupported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion.

Smith also alleged that officers searched his home without a warrant on October 1 and October 10, 2021; detained and questioned two friends and his twelve-year-old son; engaged in ongoing surveillance and intimidation; and caused him and his family to leave their home temporarily. He alleged physical and emotional injuries and asserted federal and state-law claims.

Legal standard

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. The court explained that a complaint must contain enough factual detail to make liability plausible and must give each defendant fair notice of the allegations. The court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true for purposes of the motion.

Rulings on the claims

Claims 1 and 2: unlawful arrest, seizure, excessive force, and retaliation. The court dismissed the unlawful-arrest allegations because the complaint did not clearly connect particular conduct to particular defendants, although the allegations might plausibly support an unlawful-arrest claim against at least some officers. Smith conceded that Officers Anthony Aiello, Ivan Santana, and Chris Johnson should not remain defendants on these claims. The court concluded that Smith’s allegations that he was unarmed and at home when officers removed him at gunpoint, forced him to the ground, and handcuffed him were sufficient at the pleading stage to state an excessive-force claim. Those allegations were nevertheless dismissed with leave to amend because the complaint did not clearly identify each officer’s conduct.

The retaliation allegations were dismissed because they were conclusory and did not plead all required elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim. The court allowed Smith to assert retaliation in an amended complaint if he pleaded the required elements. To the extent the complaint asserted separate claims for warrantless searches of Smith’s home, those claims were dismissed with leave to amend because they were not clearly and separately pleaded and did not specify which defendants were allegedly liable.

Claim 3: fabrication of evidence. The court dismissed the fabrication-of-evidence claim because Smith did not identify the specific evidence that officials allegedly fabricated or clearly identify which officials submitted it. The court also noted that retrospective arrest reports could not have caused the initial arrest, that Smith was never prosecuted or criminally charged, and that allegations of an unsupported arrest or warrant were covered by the unlawful-arrest claim rather than by the fabrication claim. The allegations suggested Smith might be able to state such a claim, but the existing claim was too vague and ambiguous to allow the defendants to prepare a response. The court’s conclusion dismissed the claims with leave to amend.

Claim 4: municipal and supervisory liability. The court dismissed the claims against Detective Ball and Officer Beavers because Smith conceded they should not be included. It dismissed the municipal custom-or-practice allegations against the City and the Marina Police Department because the complaint relied on conclusory assertions and allegations concerning only the incidents in this case, rather than facts showing a persistent and widespread practice. The failure-to-train claims were dismissed with leave to amend because a single incident could not establish an inadequate training policy. Any intended municipal ratification claim was also dismissed with leave to amend because the allegation that policymakers approved and failed to discipline the conduct was conclusory.

The supervisory-liability claims against Chief Tina Nieto in her personal capacity were dismissed with leave to amend. The complaint did not allege that she participated in or directed the alleged violations, or facts showing that she should have known beforehand that subordinates were unfit or that she acted with the required reckless or callous indifference. The court also stated that naming Chief Nieto in her official capacity was redundant of the municipal claims.

Claim 5: failure to train or supervise. Smith conceded that this claim was redundant, and the court dismissed it.

Claim 6: assault and battery. Smith conceded that the claim was not stated against Officers Aiello, Santana, and Johnson. The court dismissed the claim as to those officers and granted leave to amend, including as to the municipal entities mentioned in connection with the claim.

Claim 7: false imprisonment or arrest. Smith did not oppose dismissal, so the court dismissed the claim with leave to amend.

Claim 8: negligence. The court dismissed the negligence claims against Officers Aiello, Santana, and Johnson, Sergeant Richard Cox, and Commander Donna White. It also dismissed the remaining collective allegations against “all” defendants with leave to amend because they did not identify the duty allegedly owed or the breaching conduct of each defendant and were too unclear under Rule 8.

Claim 9: Bane Act. The court dismissed the Bane Act claim with leave to amend because collective allegations against “all Defendants” were too vague and Smith acknowledged that some defendants should be removed. The court stated that allegations against at least some officers could satisfy the requirement of threat, intimidation, or coercion, and that allegations of reckless disregard could support the required specific intent at the pleading stage. The court also found it unclear whether Smith intended to assert separate claims under California Civil Code sections 51 and 51.7.

Claim 10: intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court found that the allegations about removing an unarmed person from his home at gunpoint, forcing him to the ground, and handcuffing him were sufficient at the pleading stage to allege extreme and outrageous conduct. The claim was nevertheless dismissed with leave to amend because it included officers whom Smith agreed should be dismissed and needed clarification as to the remaining defendants. The court noted that Smith would still need to prove harm and causation.

Claim 11: conspiracy. Smith did not oppose dismissal, so the court dismissed the claim with leave to amend.

Claim 12: Americans with Disabilities Act. The opinion text provided states that Smith conceded he had not pleaded facts sufficient to state this claim, but the supplied excerpt ends before the court’s full discussion of this claim. The order’s final conclusion states that Smith’s claims were dismissed with leave to amend.

Disposition

The court dismissed the claims in the amended complaint with leave to amend. An amended pleading, if Smith chose to file one, was due by February 2, 2024. Judge P. Casey Pitts signed the order on January 3, 2024.