Unique v. Claybaugh

Background

Tarryn Unique and Miguel White, whom the opinion identifies as transgender individuals, sued Joseph Claybaugh and 18 other California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They alleged that Claybaugh, a staff psychologist, sexually assaulted and harassed them at Salinas Valley State Prison between March and August 2019.

The complaint asserted four groups of claims:

Defendants’ motion

The defendants sought dismissal or separation of Counts III and IV under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2), which governs when multiple defendants and claims may be joined in one lawsuit. They also argued that Counts III and IV were filed in the wrong venue under Rule 12(b)(3). In addition, they argued under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint adequately states a claim, that Counts II and IV did not plausibly allege deliberate indifference. They separately argued that the official-capacity claims against Hill and Macomber failed to identify an ongoing unconstitutional CDCR policy or practice.

Joinder

The court ruled that all four counts were properly joined. It found that Counts I, II, and III involved overlapping facts concerning Claybaugh’s alleged misconduct and the grievances filed about it. Count IV was also sufficiently related because Counts II and IV both concerned alleged failures by CDCR officials to protect transgender prisoners from dangerous conditions. The court emphasized that Rule 20’s joinder standard is intended to promote efficiency and avoid duplicative lawsuits.

Venue

The court agreed that the ordinary statutory venue rules did not independently make the Northern District of California the proper venue for Counts III and IV, because the events underlying those counts occurred at facilities outside that district. But it applied the doctrine of pendent venue, which can allow closely related claims to proceed alongside claims properly venued in the district. The court found Counts III and IV closely related to Counts I and II because they concerned the alleged assaults, the defendants’ responses to them, and an alleged common CDCR practice involving the treatment and housing of transgender prisoners. The court therefore allowed Counts III and IV to remain in the case.

Deliberate indifference claims

For an Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim, the court explained that a plaintiff must plausibly allege both an objectively serious risk of harm and that the defendant actually knew of the substantial risk. The court ruled that Count II met this standard. Although Unique and White did not expressly tell the SVSP defendants about Claybaugh’s misconduct, they alleged that those defendants observed Claybaugh’s unusual interest in them, knew he met with them alone, knew he violated safety protocols, and knew of the heightened risk of sexual assault faced by transgender prisoners. The court concluded that these allegations were enough to plausibly show actual knowledge of the risk and denied the motion to dismiss Count II.

The court also ruled that Count IV adequately pleaded deliberate indifference. The complaint alleged that the housing defendants knew from Unique’s and White’s files about their transgender status and, in White’s case, her history of sexual victimization and prior assaults. The complaint further alleged that officials nevertheless placed them in dormitory or tent housing, after which White suffered additional assaults. The court concluded that these allegations plausibly showed that the defendants knew of the risks associated with the housing decisions and denied the motion to dismiss the individual-capacity claims in Count IV.

Official-capacity claims

The court denied the motion to dismiss the official-capacity claims against Hill and Macomber. It found that Unique and White had identified an alleged CDCR policy or practice of failing to protect transgender prisoners and had alleged a systematic failure to follow federal Prison Rape Elimination Act housing protections. The court also found that White’s alleged endorsement for a future transfer to dormitory housing created a sufficiently likely future threat to support a request for injunctive relief.

Disposition

The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The order did not resolve whether the plaintiffs will ultimately prove their claims; it held that the claims challenged in the motion could remain in the lawsuit.