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N.D. Cal.Procedural orderFiled Jan. 29, 2024

UnifySCC v. Cody

Judge
Beth Freeman
Docket
5:22-cv-01019
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
26
Class ActionCivil ProcedureEmploymentFirst Amendment
In one sentence

In UnifySCC v. Cody, Judge Freeman granted in part and denied in part class certification, covering liability issues but not damages.

Who this affects

The order affects UnifySCC, Tom Davis, Maria Ramirez, Elizabeth Baluyut, and the certified class of people meeting the court’s stated definition: individuals who worked for or were subject to Santa Clara County’s vaccine policies, were classified as working in high-risk jobs, received a religious exemption, and met the order’s other requirements during August 5, 2021 through September 27, 2022. It also affects Santa Clara County and the other defendants because the certified class may litigate the specified liability questions collectively.

What happened

UnifySCC v. Cody concerns Santa Clara County’s COVID-19 vaccination policy for County personnel, including religious exemptions and different work accommodations based on job risk. The plaintiffs sought to represent people with religious exemptions who held high-risk jobs and were placed on unpaid leave or otherwise affected by the policy.

The court granted in part and denied in part the motion for class certification. It certified a class to decide five liability questions involving religious freedom, equal protection, employment accommodations under California law and Title VII, and hostility toward religion under the Establishment Clause. It did not certify the class to decide damages because those calculations would require individualized information about each person.

Judge Beth Labson Freeman also appointed UnifySCC, Tom Davis, Maria Ramirez, and Elizabeth Baluyut as class representatives and ordered the lead plaintiffs to file a proposed notice plan by February 14, 2024.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
UnifySCC v. Cody · No. 5:22-cv-01019
Judge
Beth Freeman
Date
Jan. 29, 2024

Background

Santa Clara County adopted a COVID-19 vaccination policy on August 5, 2021. The policy required County personnel to be vaccinated and boosted, subject to limited medical, disability, and religious exemptions. Employees who received exemptions were assigned to lower-, intermediate-, or high-risk tiers based on factors such as contact with other people, the populations they served, and the risk of an outbreak.

Exempt employees in lower-risk positions could work with masking and weekly testing. Those in intermediate-risk positions could work with stronger masking and twice-weekly testing. The County did not initially allow exempt employees to remain in high-risk positions; instead, it placed them on leave while assisting with possible reassignment or transfer. The County later amended the policy to allow unvaccinated individuals in high-risk roles to work if they had an approved exemption and completed specified safety measures.

The plaintiffs—UnifySCC, Tom Davis, Maria Ramirez, and Elizabeth Baluyut—asserted claims involving the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They asked the court to certify a class of people who worked for or were subject to the County’s vaccine policies, were classified as working in high-risk jobs, and received religious exemptions during the period from August 5, 2021, through September 27, 2022, among other stated requirements.

Class-Certification Analysis

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 requires a proposed class to satisfy requirements including sufficient numbers of members, common legal or factual questions, typical claims by the named representatives, and adequate representation. For the type of class requested here, common questions also must predominate over individual questions, and a class action must be a superior method for resolving the dispute.

The court found that the proposed class met the requirements for numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy. Plaintiffs presented evidence indicating that the class included at least 463 people. The court concluded that common questions could be answered using evidence about the County’s policy and practices, including whether the County prioritized medical or disability exemptions over religious exemptions, whether the Risk Tier System violated constitutional protections, whether the religious-exemption process was neutral and generally applicable, whether the accommodations were reasonable, and whether the County demonstrated hostility toward religion.

The court also found that common questions predominated for determining the County’s potential liability under the Free Exercise Clause, the Fair Employment and Housing Act, the Equal Protection Clause, Title VII, the Establishment Clause, and the municipal-liability claim. It rejected the County’s argument that individual questions about transfers, accommodations, job qualifications, and other circumstances prevented certification of liability issues, reasoning that those matters primarily concerned damages rather than liability.

The court found that the plaintiffs’ damages models were consistent with their liability theories. However, it concluded that damages would require individualized calculations involving matters such as wages, paid and unpaid leave, health-care costs, mitigation of damages, and other employment. Because individual damages questions predominated, the court declined to certify the class for damages. The court found a class action superior for resolving liability issues, but not for damages.

Order

The court GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. It certified the defined class for five common liability questions:

  1. Whether the defendants violated free-exercise and equal-protection rights by prioritizing medical exemptions over religious exemptions in high-risk settings.
  2. Whether the Risk Tier System violated the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses by placing plaintiffs and class members on unpaid leave while allowing some unvaccinated or non-boosted employees to continue working.
  3. Whether the County’s religious-exemption or accommodation procedure was non-neutral or not generally applicable and therefore subject to strict scrutiny.
  4. Whether the defendants provided reasonable accommodations as required by the Fair Employment and Housing Act and Title VII.
  5. Whether the defendants violated the Establishment Clause by demonstrating hostility toward religion.

The court expressly stated that the class was not certified with respect to questions of damages. It appointed UnifySCC, Davis, Ramirez, and Baluyut as class representatives, appointed Advocates for Faith & Freedom and Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freemen & Herz LLP, as reflected in the order, and required the lead plaintiffs to file a proposed notice plan by February 14, 2024. This order addressed class certification; it did not decide whether the County ultimately violated the laws or constitutional provisions at issue.

The authoritative version

Read the full 26-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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