Kissner v. Loma Prieta Joint Union School District

Background

David M. Kissner sued Loma Prieta Joint Union School District and others after the District pursued his dismissal from his position as a sixth-grade math and science teacher. The case originally included nineteen claims and thirteen named defendants and unnamed defendants. After earlier rulings, the only remaining claim was Kissner’s “stigma-plus” defamation claim against former District superintendents Lisa Fraser and Kevin Grier.

The claim concerned the District’s disclosure of a Statement of Charges in response to two California Public Records Act requests. The Statement included an allegation of “potential grooming behavior,” among other charges. The District later withdrew the grooming allegation before Kissner’s administrative termination hearing, and the allegation was not included in the charges presented to the Commission on Professional Competence. The Commission ultimately directed the District to terminate Kissner for evident unfitness for service and found that he had not engaged in “immoral conduct.”

Kissner argued that the disclosures stigmatized him and harmed his future employment opportunities without due process. He pointed to his difficulty finding work and an incident involving a company that had hired him to teach online math but later terminated him after an employee mentioned the grooming allegation. The opinion also notes that it was unclear whether information about the allegation reached that company through the District, rather than through Kissner’s lawsuit or online comments by others.

Legal standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, but that party must identify evidence that could allow a jury to rule in its favor.

Qualified immunity generally protects a government official from damages unless the plaintiff shows both a constitutional violation and that the violated right was clearly established when the conduct occurred. A right is clearly established only when existing precedent would have made the unlawfulness of the official’s conduct clear to every reasonable official.

Discussion

A “stigma-plus” defamation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a public disclosure by the government of a stigmatizing and contested statement, plus the denial of a more tangible legally protected interest, such as employment. The court accepted for purposes of the motion that the grooming allegation was stigmatizing and contested. The dispute concerned the required additional interest.

The court held that Kissner’s termination from the District did not supply the required additional interest because the April and July 2021 disclosures did not cause the termination to take effect. His termination became effective only after the Commission issued its decision in December 2021. The court also noted that Kissner received extensive process in connection with the termination, including notice of the charges, representation by counsel, discovery rights, the ability to subpoena and depose witnesses, and a multi-day evidentiary hearing before a three-member administrative panel.

The court concluded that the disclosures harmed Kissner’s reputation but did not alter or extinguish his legal right to future employment. Unlike a government-created registry that employers or licensing agencies are required to consult, the District’s disclosures were sent to two individuals in response to public-records requests. The fact that others later posted the material online did not establish a clearly defined constitutional violation under the precedent cited by Kissner.

The court separately considered whether the process provided was inadequate. It held that it was not clearly established that Kissner was entitled to a separate name-clearing hearing in connection with the disclosures, which occurred eight and five months before his termination became effective. Even assuming the disclosures triggered a right to name-clearing procedures, the court found that the process surrounding Kissner’s termination appeared adequate. The court acknowledged that Kissner did not litigate the withdrawn grooming allegation before the Commission, but found no cited authority clearly requiring a separate name-clearing hearing for an allegation the District had voluntarily withdrawn.

Disposition

The court held that (1) it was not clearly established that Kissner was entitled to due process in connection with the Public Records Act disclosures and (2) even if he was entitled to due process, it was not clearly established that the District’s process was inadequate. The court therefore granted Defendants’ second motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.