Flesch v. County of Lake

Background

Daniel G. Flesch, identified in the complaint as a senior deputy district attorney at the Lake County District Attorney’s Office, sued Robert Brown, the County of Lake, and unnamed defendants. The complaint alleged that investigations and disparaging comments by Brown, supervisors, and coworkers between August 2014 and August 2020 violated Flesch’s federal and state civil rights and employment rights.

The complaint asserted 15 causes of action, including claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of free-speech and equal-protection rights; retaliation and discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; claims under California employment laws; and claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Brown moved to dismiss the first, sixth, fourteenth, and fifteenth causes of action. The County moved to dismiss the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, seventh, tenth, twelfth, fourteenth, and fifteenth causes of action. Brown also moved to strike.

Rulings on Brown’s Motion

The court held that the continuing-violations doctrine did not preserve Flesch’s federal claims based on earlier alleged acts. The court explained that Flesch alleged separate, individualized acts rather than a class-wide pattern or practice, and therefore evaluated the sufficiency of the federal claims based on allegations occurring after March 23, 2019.

The court granted Brown’s motion to dismiss the First Amendment free-speech claim because the complaint did not adequately allege that Brown, a County Board of Supervisors member, was Flesch’s employer or had taken an adverse employment action as an employer. The court granted dismissal of the equal-protection claim because the complaint did not allege sufficient facts showing that Brown or the County intended to discriminate against Flesch because of his Jewish faith.

The court also granted dismissal of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because the complaint did not adequately allege conduct that was extreme and outrageous. It granted dismissal of the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim because the complaint did not establish that Brown owed Flesch a specific duty of care.

Rulings on the County’s Motion

For the First and Second Causes of Action, which relied on County policies, practices, customs, training, or supervision under § 1983, the court found that the complaint did not identify the content of the alleged policy or custom, explain how it caused the alleged constitutional deprivation, identify the specific training that was lacking, or allege facts showing a deliberate choice by the County to risk a likely constitutional violation.

For the Third and Fourth Causes of Action, which concerned a final policymaker and ratification, the court found that the complaint did not identify the actions allegedly ratified, the policymaker who ratified them, or how that policymaker knew of and approved Brown’s conduct.

For the Seventh Cause of Action, a Title VII discrimination claim, the court found that the complaint did not state when Flesch filed with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing. The court therefore found that the complaint did not adequately plead timely exhaustion of administrative remedies.

For the Tenth Cause of Action under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, the court found that the complaint did not adequately plead discrimination. It did not identify Flesch’s employer or allege that Brown’s actions were taken on behalf of the County as an official employment action.

For the Twelfth Cause of Action, the court found that the complaint did not adequately allege harassment that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive work environment. For the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Causes of Action, the court found that the complaint failed to adequately plead the emotional-distress claims for the reasons discussed regarding Brown’s motion.

Disposition

Judge Susan Illston granted the motions to dismiss filed by Brown and the County of Lake and granted Flesch leave to amend. The order did not state that the dismissals were with or without prejudice. Flesch had 30 days from the date of the order to submit an amended complaint. The court denied Brown’s motion to strike as moot.