Ciria v. City and County of San Francisco

Background

Pedro Ciria and Yojana Paiz sued the City and County of San Francisco, Arthur Gerrans, James Crowley, and Nicholas J. Rubino. Their first amended complaint alleged three causes of action arising from Joaquin Ciria’s arrest, conviction, and incarceration: loss of familial association under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

The plaintiffs alleged that inspectors pressured witnesses to implicate Joaquin, ignored evidence supporting his innocence, and helped secure his arrest and conviction. Joaquin’s conviction was vacated on April 18, 2022, and he was released on April 20, 2022. The plaintiffs submitted government claims to San Francisco on October 17, 2022, and filed their first amended complaint on October 2, 2023.

Judicial Notice

The defendants asked the court to consider excerpts from the transcript of Joaquin’s criminal trial and the plaintiffs’ government-claim forms. The court denied the request as to the trial transcript because it was not relevant to the motion, which concerned pretrial conduct. The court treated the government-claim forms as incorporated into the complaint and therefore granted the request in part and denied it in part.

Federal Familial-Association Claim

The court analyzed the federal claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due-process protection for familial association. It held that Pedro had standing—meaning he could bring the claim—as a child of Joaquin. The court held that Paiz could not bring the same Fourteenth Amendment claim because she and Joaquin were not legally married. Paiz was granted leave to amend to allege a familial-association claim under the First Amendment.

The court rejected the defendants’ argument that the alleged conduct did not meet the required “shocks the conscience” standard. Accepting the complaint’s allegations at this stage, the court concluded that alleged witness pressure, fabrication of evidence, withholding of evidence, and resulting incarceration would be intolerable and unacceptable if true.

The court also rejected qualified immunity for the individual defendants. Qualified immunity can protect government officials from liability when the law did not clearly establish that their conduct was unlawful. The court found that, based on the allegations that the defendants pressured witnesses to provide false testimony leading to Joaquin’s arrest and conviction, the officers were not entitled to that protection. The motion to dismiss was therefore denied as to the § 1983 claim, except for Paiz’s Fourteenth Amendment claim.

State-Law Emotional-Distress Claims

The court held that California Government Code § 821.6 immunized the defendants from liability for state-law claims based on Joaquin’s post-arraignment incarceration. The immunity did not cover the alleged false arrest and imprisonment before arraignment. The state-law claims were therefore limited to the period between Joaquin’s arrest and arraignment.

The court rejected the argument that the state-law claims were untimely. It concluded that the claims accrued when Joaquin was released from incarceration after his conviction was vacated, and that the plaintiffs submitted their government claims within the applicable six-month period.

The court dismissed the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim with leave to amend. As to Pedro, the court found that the complaint did not allege facts showing that he contemporaneously and meaningfully understood the connection between the defendants’ conduct and his father’s injury. Paiz conceded that her claim was not adequately pleaded and requested leave to amend.

The court dismissed the negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim with prejudice. It explained that negligent infliction of emotional distress is treated as a negligence claim, but the complaint alleged intentional conduct, including witness intimidation and evidence fabrication. The plaintiffs also conceded that they had no factual basis for a negligence claim.

Disposition

Judge Kandis A. Westmore granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The first cause of action under § 1983 was dismissed as to Paiz, with leave to amend under the First Amendment. The second cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress was dismissed with leave to amend and limited by § 821.6 to the period between Joaquin’s arrest and arraignment. The third cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress was dismissed with prejudice. The motion was denied in all other respects. The plaintiffs were ordered to file an amended complaint within 14 days.