Fink-Carver v. Kuhn

Background

Jennifer Fink-Carver called 9-1-1 on May 9, 2020, seeking help removing her fiancé, Gary Armas, and his daughter from the home where Carver and Armas lived. Armas told officers that Carver had struck him the previous day with her fist, a television remote, and a cordless phone, and officers observed that he had a black eye. Carver shut and locked the front door, did not answer repeated police requests, and ended a phone call when an officer identified himself.

Officer Johnson obtained a house key from Armas, entered the home, and opened the door. Kuhn arrived with his police canine, Bodie. Carver came into the front room after officers ordered her to come out with her hands up. Officers entered, brought Carver down onto a couch, and began handcuffing her. Bodie bit and held Carver’s thigh for 11 seconds. Officers then searched the home and found Carver’s firearm under her mattress.

Fink arrived less than two minutes after Carver’s arrest. After officers told him to back up, they attempted to handcuff him. Fink resisted by twisting away and pressing his hands into the grass. Kuhn then directed Bodie to bite Fink’s exposed abdomen without warning him that the dog would bite. Bodie held Fink for 16 seconds.

The plaintiffs’ claims included federal civil-rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unreasonable force, unlawful seizure, and unlawful arrest; claims against the City under supervisory-liability principles; negligence, assault, battery, and claims under California’s Bane Act. The court had previously separated the individual-liability claims from the claims against the City for discovery and trial purposes.

Summary-judgment rulings on canine use

The court held that a reasonable jury could find that Kuhn used excessive force against both plaintiffs. The bites caused substantial pain and injury, including bruising, blood, and torn flesh. Although the plaintiffs resisted arrest, the court characterized their conduct as being toward the passive end of the resistance spectrum. Carver was surrounded and being restrained by officers when she was bitten. Fink was resisting handcuffing, but he was not moving toward or attacking officers, and officers already had control of his arms.

The court found that the governmental interest in using the canine was minimal under the factors governing excessive-force claims: the alleged crimes were not especially severe in the circumstances, neither plaintiff posed an immediate threat, and less forceful methods were available. The court therefore denied Kuhn summary judgment on Carver’s Section 1983 excessive-force claim and on the plaintiffs’ related state-law claims.

The court separately applied qualified immunity, which can protect government officials from civil damages when their conduct did not violate a clearly established right. It ruled that Kuhn was not entitled to qualified immunity on Carver’s excessive-force claim. Viewing the evidence favorably to Carver, a jury could find that she was unarmed, pinned down by other officers, and not fleeing when Kuhn directed Bodie to bite her.

The court granted Kuhn qualified immunity on Fink’s Section 1983 excessive-force claim. Although the canine bite could have been excessive, the plaintiffs did not identify case law that would have clearly warned Kuhn that using a canine against a person who was still resisting handcuffing was unlawful.

Entry into and arrest inside Carver’s home

The court ruled that the warrantless entry into and arrest inside Carver’s home violated the Fourth Amendment. Armas’s consent to entry did not override Carver’s express refusal, shown by her closing and locking the door, ignoring police requests, and ending the call with Garcia. The court also found that no exigent or emergency circumstances justified entering without a warrant. Although officers had probable cause to believe Carver had committed domestic violence, probable cause alone did not justify a warrantless entry into a home.

The court concluded that Carver did not pose a threat requiring immediate entry and that the officers had created any claimed exigency by unlawfully entering the home. It granted Carver’s motion for partial summary judgment on the unlawful-entry claim. Kuhn was not entitled to qualified immunity on that claim because the relevant Fourth Amendment protections were clearly established.

Carver also sought summary judgment concerning the search of her home and seizure of her firearm. The court denied that request because the complaint did not adequately plead a claim challenging the firearm seizure or home search. The complaint did not mention the firearm or search and instead generally referred to unlawful seizures of the plaintiffs’ persons.

Fink’s unlawful-arrest claim

Fink’s claims were limited to Kuhn and the City, and Fink conceded that he was not claiming Kuhn personally arrested him. The court therefore granted Kuhn summary judgment on Fink’s unlawful-arrest claim.

As to the City, however, the court denied Fink’s motion for partial summary judgment because genuine disputes remained about whether the arresting officers had probable cause. A jury could find that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Fink because the videos did not clearly show what he did to resist, delay, or obstruct the officers before they began handcuffing him. The court noted that resistance to handcuffing would be unlawful only if the officers’ arrest conduct was itself lawful.

State-law claims and other rulings

The court denied Kuhn’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ negligence, battery, and Bane Act claims. It found factual disputes about whether the force was reasonable and concluded that a jury could find that Kuhn acted with the specific intent required for a Bane Act claim—that is, that he intended not only to use force but also to use it unreasonably. The court also rejected Kuhn’s asserted California statutory immunities because the plaintiffs alleged injuries caused by the officers’ conduct and because the reasonableness of the force remained disputed.

The court resolved several evidentiary objections, including sustaining some objections to exhibits and expert or deposition materials, overruling others, and leaving certain challenges open for possible later motions under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. It also admonished plaintiffs’ counsel for filing the opposition and cross-motion one day late.

Disposition and next steps

The court stated that the parties’ motions were granted in part and denied in part. Kuhn received qualified immunity on Fink’s federal excessive-force claim, but not on Carver’s federal excessive-force and unlawful-entry claims or the remaining state-law claims. The unlawful-arrest claims were dismissed as against Kuhn, but not as against the City. The court found that factual disputes remained concerning Fink’s probable cause for arrest and the reasonableness of Kuhn’s force against both plaintiffs.

Under the earlier bifurcation order, the first trial phase will proceed against Kuhn only. The court listed Carver’s federal unreasonable-force and unlawful-entry claims, Carver’s state-law claims against Kuhn, and Fink’s negligence, assault, and battery claims against Kuhn as pending for that phase. Claims against the City were reserved for a possible second phase. The court also ordered the parties to appear for a further case-management conference on March 22, 2024.