Markham v. Tolbert

Background

Oji Konata Markham sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law that allows claims for violations of constitutional rights by people acting under state authority. He challenged his January 22, 2016 arrest in Brooklyn Park, Minnesota, on suspicion of domestic assault and criminal property damage. Markham alleged that the arresting officers violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by entering the shared areas of his residence without a warrant, consent, or urgent circumstances, and by entering his private rented room and using force to remove him.

A magistrate judge previously recommended dismissing all claims except the allegation that the arrest was carried out inconsistently with the Fourth Amendment, and dismissing all defendants except Chad Glirbas, Stephen Hilyar, Andrew Tolbert, Shepherd, Ben Miller, and Officer 193. The district court adopted that recommendation. Officer 193 later identified himself as Michael Wrobel. Defendants moved for summary judgment, which asks whether the record shows no genuine dispute over an important fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law.

Claims Against Officers Other Than the Arresting Officers

The court ruled that claims against Glirbas, Hilyar, and Shepherd could not proceed because the record did not show their personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations during the arrest. The court stated that a § 1983 claim requires evidence connecting each individual defendant directly to the alleged deprivation of rights. Markham did not allege that Hilyar or Shepherd were present during the arrest, and the arrest report identified only Tolbert, Miller, and Wrobel as present. Markham did not challenge that evidence.

Entry Into the Residence

The court considered whether the arresting officers had consent to enter the residence. The defendants did not claim that they had an arrest warrant or that urgent circumstances justified entering without one. The court therefore focused on consent.

The court held that Kaldun had actual or apparent authority to consent to entry because she owned and lived in the residence, and the officers reasonably understood that she controlled the residence and knew Markham’s movements there. The court also held that there was no genuine dispute about whether she consented. The audio recording showed that, after the officers asked whether Markham was present, Kaldun told them, “You can go down,” and identified Markham’s basement room. The court found no evidence that the officers forced their way inside, coerced Kaldun, or deceived her into allowing entry. The fact that the officers did not disclose that they intended to arrest Markham did not make their request a deceitful misrepresentation.

Alleged Seizure From the Private Room

Markham separately alleged that one or more officers pushed into his room, grabbed him, and pulled him out. The court ruled that this claim could not proceed because Markham did not identify which officer allegedly performed that conduct, even after having an opportunity to conduct discovery. The court treated that failure as a fatal defect because liability for a constitutional violation is personal to each defendant. The court expressly stated that, because the claim could not proceed, it did not need to decide whether the alleged conduct was unconstitutional.

Disposition

The court granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety and ordered judgment entered. The order therefore resolved the remaining claims in favor of the defendants. The opinion reached the merits of the residence-entry claim but disposed of the private-room seizure claim without deciding its constitutionality.