Gutzalenko v. City of Richmond

Background

Plaintiffs, who are family members of Ivan Gutzalenko, sued AMR West and paramedic Damon Richardson over events shortly before Gutzalenko’s death. According to the complaint, police officers handcuffed Gutzalenko after a struggle, and Richardson injected him with Versed, described as a chemical restraint. Plaintiffs alleged that Richardson failed to aspirate the syringe, that Gutzalenko stopped breathing within 90 seconds, and that he later died. The City of Richmond and several police officers were also defendants, but they were not parties to this motion.

The Second Amended Complaint asserted five federal and state causes of action, identified in the order as Counts One through Six: claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute; a California Bane Act claim; negligence; assault and battery; and false arrest and imprisonment. Defendants AMR West and Richardson moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim, and moved to strike under Rule 12(f).

Section 1983 Claims

Defendants argued that the complaint did not adequately allege that Richardson acted under color of state law or that he violated Gutzalenko’s Fourteenth Amendment substantive due-process rights. The court focused on whether Richardson’s injection of Versed could qualify as state action because he worked for a private ambulance company.

The court explained that a private party may be liable under Section 1983 when the party’s conduct is fairly attributable to the government, including when the party willfully participates in joint action with state agents. The complaint alleged that Richardson acted in a law-enforcement manner and assisted Richmond police in detaining and arresting Gutzalenko. Although the court found the allegations about the injection’s purpose somewhat conclusory, it held that the alleged facts and reasonable inferences were sufficient at the pleading stage to state state-action allegations. The court denied the motion to dismiss Counts One and Two on that ground, while noting that the state-action issue could be revisited after discovery.

Bane Act

The California Bane Act requires intentional interference, by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with constitutional or statutory rights. The court concluded that the alleged failure to aspirate the syringe was described as resulting from inadequate training and was not alleged to be intentional. Plaintiffs also did not allege intentional interference with their right to familial association. The court granted dismissal of Count Three, the Bane Act claim.

Negligence

The court treated the negligence claim as medical negligence because Richardson was providing emergency medical services and using his medical training, even if the injection also served a law-enforcement purpose. Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that Richardson negligently failed to aspirate the syringe and that this failure proximately caused Gutzalenko’s death.

However, the court held that the complaint did not adequately show that plaintiffs could not have discovered defendants’ involvement in the death more than one year before filing the First Amended Complaint. The court therefore granted dismissal of Count Four, the negligence claim, with leave to amend.

Assault and Battery

Defendants argued that plaintiffs had to meet the heightened standard for medical battery involving a deliberate deviation from consent. The court rejected that argument because the complaint alleged that Gutzalenko could not consent to any treatment, rather than consenting to one treatment and receiving another. The allegations did not show that a legal representative or closest available relative consented to the Versed injection.

The court further held that whether an emergency existed that implied consent was a factual question not suitable for resolution on a motion to dismiss. It denied the motion to dismiss Count Five, the assault-and-battery claim.

False Arrest and Imprisonment

The court held that false arrest and false imprisonment are not separate torts under the circumstances described. Plaintiffs adequately alleged that Richardson assisted police in detaining and arresting Gutzalenko and could be liable if he acted in a law-enforcement rather than medical capacity. Plaintiffs also adequately alleged intentional, nonconsensual confinement for an appreciable period. Whether the confinement was without lawful privilege remained a disputed factual issue. The court denied the motion to dismiss Count Six.

Damages and Attorney’s Fees

The court granted the motion to strike plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages. For the Section 1983 claims, the allegations did not show the evil motive, intent, reckless conduct, or callous indifference required for punitive damages. For the state-law claims, the allegations did not show oppression, fraud, or malice.

The court denied the motion to strike plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees under Section 1983 because it denied dismissal of the Section 1983 claims.

Disposition

Judge Edward M. Chen granted dismissal of Count Three and granted dismissal of Count Four with leave to amend. He denied the motion to dismiss Counts One and Two, Count Five, and Count Six. He granted the motion to strike the request for punitive damages and denied the motion to strike the request for attorney’s fees under Section 1983. The court gave plaintiffs 21 days from the order’s date to file an amended complaint. The order disposed of Docket No. 56.