DOE 1 v. GitHub, Inc.
- Jon Tigar
- 4:22-cv-06823
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 3
In J. DOE 1 v. GITHUB, Judge Tigar denied plaintiffs’ reconsideration motion, leaving prior dismissals of their claims unchanged.
The plaintiffs and GitHub, Inc., et al.; the ruling left in place the earlier dismissals of the plaintiffs’ claims.
What happened
In J. DOE 1 v. GITHUB, the plaintiffs asked the court to reconsider an earlier order. That order dismissed their Digital Millennium Copyright Act claims with permission to amend and dismissed several state-law claims permanently.
The court rejected the request. It found that the plaintiffs had not shown new facts, a change in the law, or a serious failure to consider arguments or evidence. It also stood by its conclusion that the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged identical computer-code output, rather than modified or varied output.
Judge Jon S. Tigar denied the motion for reconsideration. The earlier dismissals therefore remained in place.
The detailed version
- DOE 1 v. GitHub, Inc. · No. 4:22-cv-06823
- Jon Tigar
- Apr. 15, 2024
Background
The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the court’s prior order. That earlier order dismissed their claims under Sections 1202(b)(1) and 1202(b)(3) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, with leave to amend. It also dismissed with prejudice their state-law claims for intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic relations, unjust enrichment, negligence, and unfair competition.
Reasons for the Decision
The court explained that it could reconsider an interlocutory order—an order entered before final judgment—but that reconsideration generally requires newly discovered evidence, clear error, or an intervening change in controlling law. Under the district’s local rule, the moving party also had to show reasonable diligence and one of the specified grounds: a material difference in fact or law that was previously unknown, new material facts or a change in law after the order, or a manifest failure to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments.
The plaintiffs argued that the court should not have dismissed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act injunction claims for Does 3 and 4. The court disagreed. It explained that having standing to seek an injunction did not necessarily mean that the plaintiffs had stated a valid claim for injunctive relief. In the earlier order, the court had found that the plaintiffs failed to allege that Copilot’s output was identical because their amended complaint described the output as often being a modification. The reconsideration motion did not identify a qualifying difference in law or fact, new material facts or law, or a manifest failure to consider relevant material.
The plaintiffs also argued that the court had failed to consider GC2 v. International Game Technology. The court noted that the plaintiffs had not included that case in their most recent opposition and said it did not need to search through older briefs for buried arguments. In any event, the court found the case inapposite because it involved removal of copyright-management information from artwork copied in its entirety, while the plaintiffs alleged only that snippets of code were reproduced.
Finally, the plaintiffs argued that the court had overlooked allegations of identical output involving Doe 5’s licensed materials. The court said it had considered and rejected those allegations. It found that the amended complaint did not show identical output of any entire work by Doe 5 and that the reconsideration motion identified nothing warranting a different conclusion.
Disposition
Judge Jon S. Tigar denied the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration regarding the prior motion-to-dismiss order.
Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.