Doe v. City of Hayward

Background

Jane Doe sued the City of Hayward, police officers, and a police department in a civil-rights and tort case. The claims arose from her May 27, 2022, visit to a Hayward police station to report an alleged sexual assault, battery, and hate crime. She reported that an electronic device had been removed from her intimate parts without her consent and provided materials that she said supported her account.

Doe alleged that officers made her wait before taking her statement, approached her while she was in her car, involved a social worker, and caused her to feel surrounded. She also alleged that the resulting police disposition report contained inaccurate statements about her evidence, her explanations, and her mental health. Afterward, she sent several emails asking defendants to change the report or attach her communications, and she complained to police internal affairs and Alameda County Behavioral Health Care Services.

Federal claims

The court held that Doe failed to state a federal claim for relief. On her First Amendment claim, the court recognized that filing a criminal complaint is protected petitioning activity. But it held that she was allowed to make her report, was interviewed, and received a disposition report; she had no constitutional right to a particular investigation or prosecution.

The court also rejected her First Amendment retaliation theory. It held that the alleged conduct on May 27 did not amount to adverse action that would deter an ordinary person from continuing to complain. Regarding the allegedly false statements in the disposition report, the court explained that retaliation claims based on government speech face a high threshold. Doe did not allege that the statements affected her rights, benefits, relationship, or status with the government, or that they threatened an imminent punishment, legal sanction, coercion, persuasion, or intimidation.

The court rejected Doe’s Fourth Amendment claim because she did not allege that a search or seizure occurred. It rejected her Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection claim because she did not adequately allege an intent to discriminate against her because of membership in a protected class. The court also held that she did not identify a protected liberty or property interest or a lack of due process, and did not allege conduct that shocked the conscience, as required for her due-process theories.

The court rejected her municipal-liability claim, commonly called a Monell claim, because she had not adequately alleged a constitutional violation or that a municipal policy was the moving force behind the defendants’ actions. It held that her claim under Section 1985 did not allege deprivation of a legally protected right based on discriminatory class-based intent. It also dismissed her Section 1981 claim because that statute does not itself provide a remedy against a state actor and because the complaint did not allege facts connecting defendants’ conduct to an intent to discriminate based on race.

The court stated that each of Doe’s federal claims, identified as claims for relief one through five, was dismissed.

State-law claims

After dismissing the federal claims, the court declined to retain jurisdiction over Doe’s state-law claims. It stated that claims six through thirteen were dismissed.

Pseudonym

Doe separately moved to proceed under a pseudonym. The court said the record was insufficient to allow pseudonymous litigation given the public’s right to know who seeks relief in federal court. Nevertheless, it permitted Doe to proceed under a pseudonym for present purposes and stated that it would revisit the issue if the case were resurrected.

Disposition

The court dismissed the complaint without prejudice. Doe may seek leave to amend by motion on a normal thirty-five-day schedule, with the motion noticed by May 10, 2024, at noon. The court stated that she must obtain leave before filing an amended complaint and that her request to amend, made at the end of supplemental briefing, was not granted. The order also stated that she may appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit within thirty days after entry of judgment.